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ABSTRACT: This article explores the sorely overlooked role of science within the civil 
society scheme, subscribing a scientific sphere of influence according to the 
minimalist civil society model. It first introduces the relevance of this sphere to the 
civil society project as a whole, and then provides a case study of one organization of 
scientists, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI), situated 
on the border of the science and civil spheres. The study reviews SPSSI’s successes 
in advancing values today associated with civil society, and then examines more 
closely the challenges that have been posed to such activities by the state, market, 
science, and civil realms alike. These challenges, it is argued, are a threat to all 
organizations seeking to advance the values of civil society, and such organizations 
would do well to prepare for the probable interference by each of these spheres as 
SPSSI did not. In addition, those aspects of SPSSI’s history unique to social scientific 
endeavors can illuminate challenges which civil society researchers share as social 
scientists with a particular social vision. SPSSI’s perpetual negotiation of two sets of 
tensions – that between elitism and democratic values; and that between scientific 
neutralist and social engagement – reveal the paradoxes inherent in any social 
scientific movement. Finally, it is concluded that studies of “borderland” organizations 
like SPSSI may provide a fruitful point of departure for further studies of science and 
civil society. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Der Beitrag untersucht die stark vernachlässigte Rolle der 
Wissenschaften im ‚Projekt Zivilgesellschaft’ und skizziert die wissenschaftliche 
Einflusssphäre vor dem Hintergrund eines minimalistischen Zivilgesellschaftsmodells. 
Die Bedeutung dieser Sphäre für das ‚Projekt Zivilgesellschaft’ insgesamt wird 
zunächst umrissen und sodann beispielhaft anhand einer Fallstudie über die „Society 
for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI)“, einer wissenschaftlichen 
Organisation an der Grenze zwischen Wissenschaft und der Sphäre 
bürgerschaftlichen Engagements, vertieft. Die Studie gibt einen Überblick über die 
Erfolge, die SPSSI bei der Verbreitung von Werten hatte, die heute mit 
‚Zivilgesellschaft’ verbunden werden, und untersucht dann näher die 
Herausforderungen, denen diese Aktivitäten von seiten des Staates, des Marktes, 
der Wissenschaft und der Bereiche zivilgesellschaftlichen Engagements 
gleichermaßen ausgesetzt waren. Diese Herausforderungen, so wird argumentiert, 
stellen eine Bedrohung für alle Organisationen dar, die versuchen, 
zivilgesellschaftliche Werte voranzubringen, so dass diese, anders als SPSSI, gut 
daran täten, sich auf mögliche Störungen aus jeder dieser Sphären vorzubereiten. 
Diese Aspekte der für sozialwissenschaftliche Bestrebungen einzigartigen 
Geschichte von SPSSI können darüber hinaus die Herausforderungen erhellen, 
denen sich Forscher der Zivilgesellschaft als Sozialwissenschaftler mit einer 
besonderen sozialen Vision gegenüber sehen. Der ständige Balanceakt von SPSSI 
zwischen zwei Spannungsverhältnissen – zum einen zwischen Elitismus und 
demokratischen Werten, zum anderen zwischen wissenschaftlichem Neutralismus 
und sozialem Engagement – enthüllt die Widersprüche, die jeder 
sozialwissenschaftlichen Bewegung innewohnen. Daher können Studien über 
Organisationen „im Grenzgebiet“ wie SPSSI, so die Schlussfolgerung, einen 
fruchtbaren Ausgangspunkt für weitere Forschungen über das Verhältnis von 
Wissenschaft und Zivilgesellschaft bieten. 
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Science and Civil Society: Lessons from an Organization at the 
Borderland 
The vital advent of the historical perspective into the field of civil society 
research marks a (literally) definitive moment in the field’s young history. 
Comparative and historical studies have largely shifted discussion from 
normative, idealized conceptions of civil society to real approximations of that 
concept. These empirical studies, in addition to those re-examinations of the 
term’s intellectual history which have shown it to be far less monochromatic 
than had been previously assumed, have led civil society researchers to 
consider anew what, exactly, they claim to study. From the historian’s 
perspective, this re-examination is a critical step for the growth of the civil 
society project. As Margaret Somers has convincingly described, the vague 
ahistorical umbrella definition which prevailed in the early years of the concept’s 
modern revival was not only unhelpful to its study, but also did it a disservice by 
paradoxically naturalizing a normative vision of the sphere (Somers, 1995).  
Recent more empirical reformulations have proven more fruitful. These new 
definitions of civil society may be organized within a tripartite classification 
(Alexander, 1998; Perez-Diaz, 1998). The first category of definitions, Perez-
Diaz’s “generalist” school, most closely approximates the prior catch-all 
conception. Alongside Locke, Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, Rousseau, and 
Tocqueville, contemporary researchers like Ernest Gellner and Perez-Diaz 
prefer broad definitions which allow for the study of complex systematic 
interactions among what others conceive of as separate spheres. The second 
school takes civil society to refer to all non-governmental space, collapsing the 
Hegelian market, public, and private spheres. First pessimistically proposed by 
Marx in the nineteenth century, this perspective has been adopted by 
researchers across the political spectrum, from the most left-wing statists to 
ultra-conservative anti-statists. Finally, the “minimalist” position chooses to 
exclude both economy and state, if not also many other spheres, from its 
definition. Gramsci, Habermas, Cohen and Arato, and Jeffrey Alexander would 
all be best placed here. These thinkers focus on associations, public discourse, 
communications, social movements, peculiar institutions, and shared values of 
equality, pluralism, and respect as the lifeblood of an independent public sphere 
called “civil society.”  
Its analytic specificity makes this last class the most conducive to particular 
empirical study.1 To identify a separate sphere is not, as Perez-Diaz has 
asserted, “to reject such a systematic link among the diverse components of 
what I [as a generalist] call civil society,” nor is it “to see fundamental conflicts 
                                            
1  Perez-Diaz has argued otherwise (Perez-Diaz, 1998). I stand with Alexander in his response 
to Perez-Diaz’s claims, as echoed here (Alexander, 1998, p.18). 
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between economic markets, the state and what they [the minimalists] call civil 
society” (Perez-Diaz, 1998, 213). Rather, to speak of a delimited realm of public 
interaction separate from market, state, and, as I will assert, numerous other 
spheres, is to approach a more exact analysis of the vast range of interactions 
which generalists would unhelpfully subsume under one catch-all term. If we are 
to understand how a realm of active, respectful, and equal civic engagement is 
fostered, we must be able to distinguish it from other, differently-motivated, 
spheres of interaction.  
To that end, I here propose a fourth sphere within the minimalist scheme 
whose theoretically independent authority can be shown to affect the civil 
society sphere in a number of ways: the sphere of science. In that proposal, this 
work stands alongside those of the many empirically-minded researchers today 
calling for work that will bring more specifity to our delineation of the civil sphere 
(Kumar, 1993; Ehrenberg, 1999; Trentmann, 2000). As John Ehrenberg writes, 
“simply understanding it as a nonmarket, nonstate sphere of voluntary public 
activity is not enough to help us make crucial distinctions between Robert 
Putnam’s bowling leagues, soccer teams, and choral societies on the one hand, 
and Greenpeace, the National Organization for Women, and the Ku Klux Klan 
on the other” (Ehrenberg,1999, p. 235-6). Delineating more spheres like science 
can both reduce and particularize the descriptive load which “civil society” has 
had to bear.  
We can and must also consider each sphere dynamic and fluid, as Perez-
Diaz would have it. As this work will show, it is precisely in their interactions that 
the internal workings of these ever-differing spheres come into focus.2 
Alexander has thus advocated for examination of the civil society realm at its 
interface with other spheres: 
This kind of civil community can never exist as such, it can only exist ‘to 
one degree or another’. One reason is that it is always interconnected 
with, and interpenetrated by, other more or less differentiated spheres 
which have their own criteria of justice and their own system of 
rewards. There is no reason to privilege any of these non-civil spheres 
over any other. The economy, the state, religion, science, the family – 
each differentiated sphere of activity is a defining characteristic of 
modern and post-modern societies…Rather than try to reduce the 
contemporary social system to the identity of one of its spheres, I would 
suggest that we acknowledge social differentiation both as a fact and a 
                                            
2  Some recent descriptions of the fleeting, dynamic nature of civil society might well be 
described as Derridean, challenging any attempt to locate or define a civil society realm. In 
addressing this definitional tension, the field might benefit from a more explicit use of Derrida 
in its theorizing, in particular from his proposal that for practical purposes, we can and must 
speak of concepts (like civil society) as concrete entities even as we recognize their meaning 
as the product of vacillation.  
 2  
process and that we study the boundary relationships between its 
spheres.” (Alexander, 1998, pp.7-8). 
From a historical, empirical, and minimalist perspective, I propose to study the 
activities of a civically-minded professional association, the Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) poised on the border of the 
science and civil society spheres. Empowered by science, oriented towards 
society, this organization’s history of failures and successes in fostering civil 
society provides an instructive window into the interactions of state, market, and 
civil society with that fourth, and until this point sorely overlooked, sphere: 
science.  
Science and Civil Society 
Sorely overlooked, indeed. Shortly I shall have to defend the classification of 
science as a sphere within this scheme. I am here concerned with the relevance 
of science, however construed, to the civil society project.  
An Implicit Ideological Strain 
Rationality and the scientific authority it empowers figure implicitly in most any 
conception of civil society, real or ideal. Seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Enlightenment visions of civil society placed a high premium on rational 
discourse and truth. Reason formed the very lynchpoint of Kant’s, 
Mendelssohn’s, and Hegel’s civic social visions. If nineteenth century Marxist 
formulations challenged the alleged rationality of existing civil society, they 
advocated rational opposition to corrupting market forces in order to restore 
critical reason to it. Modern formulations are again dependent upon rationality 
as the foundation of the tolerance and pluralism which hold disparate groups 
together. In particular, the Habermasian conception focuses on the “reasoned” 
discourse of networked groups and individuals.3 
Theorists will thus adamantly defend the concept against allegations of any 
ideological or teleological strain (Hall, 2000; Trentmann, 2000; Keane, 1998). 
                                            
3  Habermas’s 1989 work The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was criticized for 
its neglect to explicitly include science in the public sphere. Some have argued that he was 
implicitly addressing science in his discussion of the rationality that must underlie all civil 
discussion (Olesko, 2002, p.ix). I return to this issue in the section on “respectful public 
discourse” below. 
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Civil society, it is said, is not for any one thing other than that very ability not to 
be, entirely, for any one thing. Civil society is therefore opposed to fanaticism, 
as John Hall explains: 
A final clarification should be offered about the notion of living with 
difference…One element at work is an opposition to the fanatical 
insistence that there is only one way to the truth. In this sense, civil 
society has about it a measure of relativism, for it asserts that 
difference is unavoidable, indeed desirable for those who insist that the 
ends of life are diverse. But the other side of the picture, stressing the 
sharing of belief that diversity is acceptable, is quite as important. 
Relativism is at a discount here, for some differences – most obvious 
among them, of course, fanaticism and the caging of individuals within 
social groups – are unacceptable to a civil society (Hall, 2000, 54).  
Such tolerance would be impossible without some reflective distance from one’s 
own values. This rational separation between “what I believe” and “what you 
must believe” is, then, the one and only thing which all definitions of civil society 
require. Others, of course, may add to this active civic participation (the so-
called democratic vision) or any number of values particular to one’s 
understanding of civil society. But all fundamentally depend upon mankind’s 
ability to oppose fanaticism with rationality.  
Ironically this anti-ideological stance has critical ideological implications. 
Those who would argue with the notion that Western rationality is itself a value 
need only read accounts of attempts to transport civil society to non-Western 
cultures which either do not share it, or do. In the former case, Westerners must 
contend with competing value systems, and in so doing recognize rationality as 
one of many (Keane, 1998; Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001). In the latter, we face 
foreign and sometimes conflicting, but equally logical, constructions which 
challenge the idea of a Western premium on rationality dominant since the 
Enlightenment. As Jack Goody describes, 
There is a kind of moral evaluation attached to the very concepts of 
civility, rationality, and enlightenment, qualities that are seen in 
contributing to the so-called European miracle and that are necessarily 
unique to the West. That approach makes for an ethnocentric and 
suspect social science which does little to clarify the analysis of 
undoubted achievements that took place at that time, but which must 
be seen in the light not only of those of ancient Greece, but of those of 
earlier Mesopotamia, of the Arab Middle East, and og Tang and Sung 
China (Goody, 2001, pp.153).  
Whether Western rationality is rejected or met with differing rational schemes, 
the challenge to its hegemony reveals its status as a value.  
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Science, broadly defined, represents the pinnacle of Western reason.4 The 
premium placed on rationality is reflected in the tremendous power accorded to 
“scientific opinion” in the public, state, and economic spheres. Effective 
transmission of a single new scientific discovery – of, for example, harmful 
effects of buried industrial waste - can make the market drop, groups organize, 
individuals relocate, and politicians restructure budgets and policies.  
While research into the interaction of science and civil society has only just 
begun,5 the field studying the influence of science upon society more generally 
is already well-trodden by scientists, historians and philosophers of science, 
ethicists, sociologists, anthropologists, policy-makers, and others. Civil society 
                                            
4  I leave aside here the question of the difference between reason based in revelation or 
philosophy and that based in experience (what we today consider science). While a critical 
distinction for studies focused before or during the Renaissance, certainly from Locke’s time 
on it is appropriate to equate scientific reason with rationality (Cook, 2002). The five main 
definitions of science offered in the Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd edition, are as follows: “1. 
a. The state or fact of knowing; knowledge or cognizance of something specified or 
implied...Philos. in the sense of ‘knowledge’ as opposed to ‘belief’ or ‘opinion’. 2. a. 
Knowledge acquired by study; acquaintance with or mastery of any department of 
learning...3. a. A particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized department of 
learning. 4. a. In a more restricted sense: A branch of study which is concerned either with a 
connected body of demonstrated truths or with observed facts systematically classified and 
more or less colligated by being brought under general laws, and which includes trustworthy 
methods for the discovery of new truth within its own domain…5. a. The kind of knowledge 
or of intellectual activity of which the various ‘sciences’ are examples…In mod. use chiefly: 
The sciences (in sense 4) as distinguished from other departments of learning; scientific 
doctrine or investigation. Often with defining adj. as in 4b. b. In modern use, often treated as 
synonymous with ‘Natural and Physical Science’...” These various definitions reveal the 
evolution of our modern understanding of the word from its roots in a premium placed on 
“’knowledge’ as opposed to ‘belief,’” but the constraints upon this knowledge are vague. 
Rather than employing my own more limiting definition of science in this article, I instead use 
the term as it is wielded by those who claim it: to refer to a branch of study which produces 
knowledge and truth through various “trustworthy methods for the discovery of truth within its 
own domain.” Definition 4 above most closely captures this sense. 
5  The first two such treatments, to my knowledge, were the 2000 conference in Madison, 
Wisconsin on “Science and Civil Society” as well as the journal issued in part as a follow-up 
to that conference, the July 2002 issue of Osiris. Other work has been initiated by scientists 
directly. In particular, international organizations of scientists like the UNESCO-affiliated 
International Council for Science (http://www.icsu.org) and the EU-affiliated European 
Research Area (http://www.cordis.lu/rtd2002/era-debate/era.htm) have drafted recent 
resolutions affirming a commitment to the furtherance of many civil society values, among 
them the protection of freedoms, social responsibility, transnational tolerance and 
community, education, and respect for non-Western systems of knowledge. The ERA has 
even published a contract notice for a study on the “Governance of the European Research 
Area: The Role of Civil Society.” The stated goal of the study is “to further a better 
understanding of the conditions needed for civil society to play an effective part in the 
creation of the European research area” (http://dbs.cordis.lu). In their commitments to their 
larger societies, as well as in the societies they are forming among themselves, modern 
scientists have begun to think in terms of civil society, and to define the role of science within 
it. 
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researchers stand to benefit greatly from the work underway in this field. 
Philosophers and historians of science, as well as many scientists themselves, 
have long comfortably recognized “pure science” and the absolute rationality it 
represents as an idealized construct. These fields have worked to reveal the 
many irrational forces and motivations involved in the scientific endeavor, 
deconstructing the ideal in favor of the real as civil society researchers have 
begun to do for notions of rational discourse and the concept of rationality in 
general. These disciplines are in large part devoted to exploring these social 
limits of rationality, as well as its post-Enlightenment social power as the 
grounds of all knowledge, both of which issues are critical to any understanding 
of a civic sphere.6 
Furthermore, the aforementioned questions of the imperialism of Western 
rationality have long occupied scientists in developing countries, where their 
introduction of medical, environmental, and other technologies has often been 
met with open hostility. Such workers have begun to develop more sensitive 
means of adapting to and integrating local traditions to facilitate the acceptance 
of their work. The challenges they have faced are analogous to those of social 
scientists considering the feasibility of a Western sociopolitical model in non-
Western countries, and the lessons they have gleaned therefore well worth 
consideration. Both fields stand to gain from dialogue about these issues.  
The Peculiar Position of the Social Sciences 
Within the sphere of science, the social sciences occupy a peculiar position. 
Poised on the border of the humanities and the sciences, these studies 
investigate human ideas and culture, and are therefore subject to the 
epistemological consequences of themselves being what they study. As a result 
of this recursiveness, such sciences are frequently recieved with a harsh 
skepticism spared the “hard sciences.” The human hand is far more evident in 
studies of it, rather than solely by it. We more freely trust the objectivity of a 
plasma physicist’s analysis of x-ray lasers than we might a social psychologist’s 
analysis of group dynamics. 
In the face of these challenges, the social sciences must constantly make 
explicit the scientist’s implicit claim to rationality. Social scientists are not, they 
assert, simply glorified social commentators but rather have obtained an 
objective distance from the human experience they study unavailable to non-
scientists. The latter therefore cannot make the same claims to rational 
                                            
6  For their part, historians and philosophers of science can benefit from explicit reference to 
the idea of civil society, a more specific focus for studies of the intersection of science and 
society (Broman, 2002). 
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judgment. The social scientist at once affirms the truth of her position as well as 
the lesser status of so-called common sense knowledge about society 
(Feyerband, 1978). 
I do not mean to imply a malicious intent in this claim to rational distance 
from human experience. It is critical to the work of social scientists, and so long 
as it is upheld as an ideal, rather than a reality, can only strengthen the rigor of 
those endeavors. Indeed, as I discuss below, all professions must justify their 
jurisdictions in some way (Abbott, 1988). Social scientists derive their authority 
from their claim to scientific objectivity. 
That said, that particular claim to authority has potentially dangerous moral 
implications. Studies of the early 20th century progressive American social 
sciences among which SPSSI arose have examined both the liberating and 
oppressive tendencies of their elitist rationality. At that time, disciplinary 
societies of the social sciences – then centered around sociology, economics, 
and psychology - had begun to organize for political, professional, commercial, 
and social ends (Morawski, 1986; Herman, 1995; Allport, 1954; Franks, 1975). 
Underpinning these endeavors was the presupposition of “the superiority and 
necessity of scientific rationality in a troubled and irrational social world” 
(Morawski, 1986, p.123). This vision included the beliefs that (1) “rational 
knowledge is scientific knowledge;” (2) “without the rational framework of 
science, human beings are inevitably and constantly subject to irrational, 
impulsive, and emotional actions;” and (3) “the attainment of a rational social 
order depends upon the research of human scientists for it could not emerge 
from blind tradition, political philosophy, democratic customs, or even social 
evolution” (Morawski, 1986, 115).  
While perhaps Morawski, or the psychologists of the particular era she 
studied, overstate the case, the scientific elitism implied by their claim to 
rationality is a fundamental point of tension – and, again, I am not interested in 
judging that claim – for any normative social science. Purely descriptive social 
scientists can afford to be less concerned with justifying the authority of their 
opinions. Those with normative agendas, however, must establish grounds for 
the imposition of their ideas.  
But if an elitist rationalist claim is necessary to a normative social science 
project, where does that leave those who study what they believe to be a 
fundamentally rational society? 
This paradox is critical to the civil society project. Like any social scientists, 
civil society researchers are themselves a part of that which they study, 
obtaining critical distance from it through allegedly objective study. But if the 
civil society vision is itself rooted in a belief in man’s rational capacity, 
researchers would seem to lack any grounds upon which to base the priority of 
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their own rational vision. Some, like John Keane, avoid this problem of the 
normative by insisting that the field is purely descriptive: 
The concept of civil society is today often used as an idealtyp to 
describe, explain, clarify, and understand the contours of a given slice 
of complex reality. The immediate or avowed aim of such empirical-
analytic interpretations of civil society is not to recommend courses of 
political action or to form normative judgments. Rather, the language of 
civil society is used to develop an explanatory understanding of a 
complex sociopolitical reality by means of theoretical distinctions, 
empirical research and informed judgment about its origins, patterns of 
development and (unintended) consequences…The term is mainly 
used for observational purposes (Keane, 1998, p.37; emphasis in 
original). 
Whether or not some researchers approach “civil society” as a purely 
descriptive project, they cannot deny its normative tendencies, or the roots of its 
modern revival in the reactionary political programs of Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. As Frank Trentmann describes, this normative tendency has always 
been present in the pursuit, alongside the descriptive project Keane describes: 
Whatever we think of the recent wave of Western agencies and programs 
promoting civil society, it is important to recognize that this is nothing 
fundamentally new. From its birth in eighteenth-century Britain, civil society 
combined a prescriptive and expansionist with an emancipatory momentum. It 
was a popular applied science, informing views about “how society should work” 
as well as “how society worked” (Trentmann, 2000, p.4; my emphasis). 
The paradox of a normative social science of the rational is not, in practice, 
absolute, but rather points to the delicate relationship of scientist and subject. 
Those today researching civil society because they wish to see it created – 
whether in Europe or North America, Asia or Latin America – must walk a fine 
line between elitism and an accompanying hypocriosy on the one hand; and 
empowerment and an accompanying lack of authority on the other. How does 
one impose a judgment when the imposee stands on the same epistemological 
grounds as the imposer? The civil society project blurs the lines between 
science and society, between rational study and rational existence.  
Here, again, the project would benefit from dialogue with those fields which 
have long struggled with this question. For if human irrationality was once the 
grounds and impetus for progressive social scientific authority, many have since 
become uncomfortable with the pessimism and elitism of that vision. People 
don’t have to be irrational to benefit from scientific guidance. Many social 
scientists would in fact adopt the opposite position, that man always acts 
rationally except when influenced to the contrary. But if all (or even most) 
knowledge is rational, and if all have access to the objects of social scientific 
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study, what gives the scientist’s vision priority over any other? Among other 
issues, this article will examine the negotiation of this difficult balance between 
elitism and populism by one scientific organization, the Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI).7 
The Borderland: Locating SPSSI 
 The Scientific Sphere 
I touched, above, upon the analytic merits of subdividing society into “spheres 
of influence” beyond those of state, market, and civil society.8 Scientific pursuits 
constitute one such realm. In theory though not practice, scientific authority is a 
unique and independent force, exerting the power of knowledge. Like market 
and state, science may be influenced by other spheres just as it may influence 
them, but its power is never reducible to any other. As such, it should be 
accorded a separate status in the scheme of social influence.  
While this status should be placed within the context of discussions of 
professionalization, scientific authority should not be regarded as a mere artifact 
of it. Discourse on professionalization has tended to emphasize parallels in its 
process and organization for a wide range of occupations, thereby obscuring 
critical distinctions in function, power, and social context. Within such schemes, 
scientific authority is merely a product of the development of professional norms 
analogous to those of any other field. However, as both Merton (1973) and Ben-
David (1972) have argued, science represents an independent authority of 
knowledge production that cannot be subsumed under any other source of 
power. Abbott’s (1988) proposed shift of the field’s emphasis from the study of 
common professional social structures to that of systematic jurisdictional 
                                            
7  In the July 2002 issue of Osiris, Thomas Broman suggests that two sets of questions with 
which historians of science should begin to investigate civil society are (1) that centered on 
voluntary associations engaged with science and (2) that investigating the relationship 
between science, civil society, and political authority (p.2). This article approaches both 
questions at once, investigating questions of science and political authority as they were 
experienced by a particular scientific association. 
8  This is not to say that the list of spheres may be extended indefinitely. While I here propose 
that the Hegelian scheme of market, power (state), and private spheres ignores other critical 
independent forces, the opposite extreme of delineating too many such forces, many of 
which may actually be reduced to one another, must also be avoided. Representing the 
power of knowledge not accounted for within any of the other classically discussed spheres, 
science may be clearly and helpfully delineated as an independent sphere of influence. 
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disputes offers a way of reconciling these two discussions. Within it, science 
can be understood as, on the one hand, analogous to any other profession in its 
search for realms of jurisdiction. On the other hand, because professions may 
justify their jurisdictions in any number of ways, science is distinguished by the 
particular authority supporting its jurisdiction. For example, religion supports the 
authority of the clergy, while the state supports that of not only government 
officials but also judges, lawyers, and law enforcement officials. While modern 
professional science is far from the autonomous authority early scientific 
institutions like the Royal Society envisioned, it maintains an independent power 
within the professional scheme (Merton, 1973, Ben-David, 1972; Gibbons, 
1994). And thus while many of the challenges posed to SPSSI’s authority may 
be understood within a very broad scheme of professionalization, this article is 
more interested in the specific manifestation of those concerns in scientific 
work, supported by a theoretically autonomous scientific sphere.9 
Finally, that autonomy need not, as Perez-Diaz argues, imply lack of 
interaction. This article uses science’s theoretical independence to situate the 
activities negotiated by a real organization at the boundaries between the 
scientific, state, market, and civil society – with its power of popular opinion - 
realms. On the borderland, powers can unite or clash, be co-opted or nullified. If 
the blurring of these borders is more interesting than their stasis, identification 
of that blurring is only made possible by the theoretical existence of 
independent spheres of power. 
Locating SPSSI 
The focus of this article is the Society for the Psychological Study of Social 
Issues (SPSSI). Founded as an independent organization of socially concerned 
psychologists in 1936, it later became a division of the world’s largest 
psychologists’ organization, the American Psychological Association (APA). 
Today its international membership of 3500 consists primarily of American 
psychologists, largely social psychologists, but also includes scientists and 
students from other fields and countries. Though smaller in number, this 
membership is broader in both disciplinary and geographic scope than that of 
the APA, whose 155,000 members are all American psychologists. In the most 
general terms, the society seeks to both further and apply research on and 
                                            
9  Zuoyue Wang and Thomas Broman have argued for another case in which the conflation of 
scientific organization and professionalization can sorely obscure the more subtle political 
issues in play (Broman, 2002, p.18; Z. Wang, 2002). Celia Applegate has further proposed 
that precisely this area of the intersection of scientific expertise and professionaliztion in civil 
society remains in sore need of further exploration (Appelgate, 2002, p. 357). 
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knowledge of psychological aspects of social issues. The particulars of its vision 
and activities comprise the bulk of this case study so I leave them aside here.  
I have chosen this organization as a point of departure for two reasons. 
First, as will be shown, this organization is peculiarly situated at the intersection 
of science and society, founded in order to serve the interests of the latter - 
defined in a manner that correlates to commonly invoked values of “civil society” 
- using the knowledge of the former. In can thus not only speak to the general 
plight of an organization committed to civil society (though not necessarily 
located within it) but also to that of a group specifically committed to the 
application of its own scientific studies to that end. As discussed above, this 
situation should be of prime interest to researchers in civil society negotiating 
many of the same tensions in that position. Second, this organization made a 
good case study for the practical reason that as a very self-conscious group, it 
has kept excellent records of its efforts over the course of the twentieth century. 
My own investigation only touches the brim of a well of studies undertaken by 
its members in their constant efforts to evaluate SPSSI’s past to improve its 
present. I return to this feature at the end of this article as one of the 
organization’s finest characteristics, not only for my own practical purposes, but 
also for the attainment of its own goals. 
Let us begin by plotting SPSSI on the spatial social map. I have adopted 
the Hegelian spherical scheme, and proposed four such spheres: science, 
state, market, and civil society. In deciding where to place SPSSI, we need first 
assign the grounds for that placement. Are individuals and institutions placed 
within a sphere based on primary (though not by any means exclusive) 
affiliation? If so, how is that affiliation defined? 
I here approach these questions from the reverse: what is the goal of this 
placement? For this study, it will be useful to place SPSSI on the social map in 
order to study the influences of the various spheres – which is to say the 
interactions of their various powers - upon its efforts to promote something like 
a civil society. The question of affiliation, then, is one of power and influence. In 
that vein I will speak of SPSSI as existing within the realm of science, its 
primary source of power, but at its border with the other three spheres, 
particularly that of civil society. All of SPSSI’s diverse activities and claims to 
knowledge have been rooted, first and foremost, in its scientific authority. As 
Ellen Herman has written of the rise of psychological expertise in a variety of 
forms, “scientific discovery or clinical practice, theoretical understanding or 
practical application – these represented different forms of the same enterprise, 
at least as far as the relationship between knowledge and power was 
concerned” (Herman, 1995, 11). Concerned with the practical application of 
scientific knowledge, SPSSI should therefore be located in this realm of power. 
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The question of the society’s primary affiliation in the sense not of influence 
but of responsibility and audience, is far more contentious. Dispute over these 
more ideological forms of affiliation have marked the society since its inception, 
revealing the tensions inherent in the borderline position of any such 
organization deriving its power from one sphere but addressing itself to another. 
While this dispute has no bearing on which sphere I define, for analytical 
purposes, as SPSSI’s primary source of power, it has everything to do with the 
means and ends toward which it applies that power. In this sense, we may 
speak of SPSSI as located within the scientific sphere, but on the border 
neighboring that of civil society. The themes of this borderland dispute will recur 
throughout this discussion, but I hear introduce them briefly in the context of an 
overview of the society’s history. 
SPSSI In Context: Pure and Applied Science in Early 20th Century 
America 
SPSSI was founded in 1936 among the “later-born” American disciplinary 
societies of the social sciences – sociology, economics, psychology – which 
expanded the intellectual jurisdiction of the earlier societies from the purely 
scientific to the political, moral, and economic. These societies promoted the 
role of the scientific expert in guiding an allegedly increasingly malfunctioning 
social world (Morawski, 1986, pp.111-2). A number of works have traced the 
rise of the social influence of American psychology at this time, from its origins 
in the progressive societies of the twenties and thirties to its fruition in the now 
ubiquitous popular psychological language. In 1930, a cultural critic noted 
astutely, if prematurely, that in popular parlance and judgment, “we’ve gone 
psychiatric” (qtd. in Lunbeck, 1994, p.3). By 1995, his hyperbole was fact, and 
historian Ellen Herman could assert that:  
Psychological insight is the creed of our time. In the name of 
enlightenment, experts promise help and faith, knowledge and comfort. 
They devise confident formulas for happy living and ambitious plans for 
dissolving the knots of conflict. Psychology, according to its boosters, 
possesses worthwhile answers to our most difficult personal questions 
and practical solutions for our most intractable social problems…It is 
taken for granted that [psychological experts] have a right to a central 
place in debates about the current state and future directions of 
American society. From families to governments, from abuse and 
recovery to war and urban violence, from the mysteries of individual 
subjectivity to the manifest problems of our social life, few institutions, 
issues, or spheres of existence remain untouched by the progress of 
psychology in American society (Herman, 1995, p.2). 
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Psychological ideas were gradually co-opted by other social scientific realms as 
well. Anthropologists, sociologists, and policy makers got on the psychological 
bandwagon “under the banners of ‘culture and personality,’ ‘behavioral science,’ 
and ‘community mental health’’ (Herman, 1995, p.4). Civil society research has 
not been immune to this influence. Contemporary researchers explain have 
described the fostering of civility through “changes in political psychology” (Hall, 
2000, p.52); or the “[transmutation of] political categories into psychological 
categories” (Sennett, 1978, p.259); or again the confrontation of the 
psychological consequences of socially frustrated violent impulse (Elias, 1994). 
Indeed, the now invisible hand of psychology will inevitably play an enormous 
role in shaping any modern social vision.  
The anti-psychiatry movement of the 1970s read in this onset a malicious 
and deliberate expansion of scientific control. Such thinkers warned that 
psychologists had invaded private and public spaces, from schools to the 
Senate, gradually extending the bounds of its therapeutic purview to include all. 
More recent treatments provide a more balanced view of the process, 
emphasizing that the psychologizing trend, like any historical trend, results from 
a very long and complex social shift rather than the conspiring efforts of a group 
of nepharious psychologists (Lunbeck, 1994; Herman, 1995). I am here 
interested in this trend as the backdrop for the efforts of SPSSI, which had a 
particular role within it. But the larger question of the implications of the 
psychologizing of society for the civil society endeavor is well worthy of 
treatment, particularly as modern descriptions of it increasingly emphasize 
psychological factors.10  
Until World War II, when the American government heavily recruited 
psychologists as political advisors, the influence of American psychology was 
limited to non-governmental professional, academic, and some public arenas. 
As numbers of psychologists and professions requiring psychological training 
grew, psychological associations began to multiply. Scientifically-oriented 
organizations of psychologists had first arisen the nineteenth century, but as 
specialties differentiated, so did associations. The result was a plethora of 
scientific groups - many with the same polysemous acronym: the American 
Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the 
American Psychoanalytic Association were a few of the earliest examples. In 
our own century, with the beginnings of the proliferation of psychological 
professions and practitioners, new groups began to form to address social and 
political concerns. This trajectory forshortens and recapitulates the evolution of 
social associations more generally, as described by Frank Trentmann, from 
their beginnings as learned societies to those “propelled by improvement, 
                                            
10  For example, from the normative side, how will non-Western societies receive visions based 
in Western psychology? And from the descriptive side, how is psychological theory used in 
influencing public discourse? By whom? 
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philanthropy, and public welfare” (Trentmann, 2000, p.13). This may perhaps 
point to a fundamental progression in the focus of social organizations of any 
one type, from those oriented toward the group’s more narrowly-defined needs 
and goals to those concerned with the group’s interactions with its surrounding 
society. 
The transition between these two stages was marked, for psychology, by 
heated scientific debate about the tainting of scientific psychology with social 
concerns. As Ellen Herman has written, “not all experts agreed that psychology 
had a special responsibility to grease the wheels of society…In psychology, 
there were those who drew a sharp line between science and society, kept faith 
with the laboratory as the only legitimate site for the reproduction and 
verification of new knowledge, and viewed colleagues who testified before 
Congress and spoke out on public issues as alarming proof that many 
psychologists were prone to confusing personal politics and professional 
responsibilities” (Herman, 1995, p.8). Such debate exploded in the wake of 
World War II, as more and more psychologists became politically-active or 
employed.11 Famed psychologist B.F. Skinner, as well as Harvard Professor 
Edwin G. Boring were among the more vocal dissenters, advocating the strict 
separation of scientific and the social. Playing to such nay-sayers, 1948 
candidate for the presidency of the American Psyciatric Association C.C. 
Burlingame ran on platform that he would “uphold the traditions of the 
association as a scientific medical group and not one that is trying to tell 
everyone else how to live” (qtd. in Herman, 1995, p.9).  
Discussions of the propriety of interaction between the scientific and social 
realms have perpetuated throughout this century. In her account of the rise of 
socially-oriented organizations of psychologists, Jill Morawski has 
problematized the traditionally strict division between pure and applied scientific 
concerns. “There is clear evidence throughout the sciences that the distinctions 
between ‘pure’ science and ‘socially responsible’ science are problematic and 
are in need of reconceptualization; psychology is no exception. Such 
demarcations between scientific activities are only tenable with the acceptance 
of a naïve theory of knowledge: organizational distinctions are assumer to be 
direct mirrors of real distinctions in the knowledge (and reality) itself” (1986, 
p.113). Because all scientific knowledge is a human product, “pure” science 
only exists as an ideal. To Morawski’s mind, this ideal has sorely impeded the 
                                            
11  Jessica Wang has described a parallel development among physical scientists, largely 
isolated from social action until they became politically integrated during World War II, and 
concerned about nuclear power. While she takes as her starting point John Dewey’s 1927 
articulation of this conflict between the scientific and the social , she argues that the conflict 
could not come to fruition until after scientists had been politically empowered by World War 
II (J. Wang, 2002). While this article agrees that the war was a critical turning point for the 
philosophy and outlook of SPSSI, it discusses evidence of this conflict in the organizations 
words and actions well before the post-war era. 
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work of self-proclaimed activist scientists, whose political influences are more 
apparent but no more fundamentally present than those of “pure” scientists.  
Morawski has revealed the falsity of this theoretical dichotomy still upheld 
today through an empirical analysis of American psychological organizations in 
the 1920’s and 1930’s. As she concludes in that study: 
The professional associations to which psychologists became attached 
between the two world wars belied the distinction between ‘pure’ and 
‘applied’ activities. They contradicted the division of labor presupposed 
in labeling activites as either scientific, professional, activist, or 
commercial. At the root of this blurring was a particular conception of 
the social world and its possibilities. This world view portrayed ignorant 
beings entangled in a complex, irrationally governed society; scientific 
experts represented both the external observers of this reality and the 
invisible hand capable of remedying the largely psychological 
problems. Science and organized groups of scientists stood as a 
means of rational control (Morawski, 1986, 119). 
Not only could applied science be undertaken by such groups in a “pure,” way, 
pure science was in an important sense itself inherently applied. By 
representing the possibility of rational observation, pure science enabled the 
applied and in so doing was itself, by definition, applied. 
As we will see, SPSSI’s history bears out Morawski’s assertion of the 
blurred lines between the pure and the applied, the scientific and the social. All 
members of SPSSI believed that science had something to offer society. But 
impetus for and means of that action were far more contentious. 
 SPSSI in Action: Why and How? 
From its inception, SPSSI vacillated constantly, and often consciously, between 
the scientific and social. Even while pushing the boundaries of the “applied,” 
SPSSI has tried to maintain strict scientific standards. And even as it has 
struggled to influence the public sphere, such influence has seemed to 
undermine the scientific authority in which it was rooted. The result has been 
two different lines of tension within the organization about what I will call the 
“why” and the “how” of its work. These tensions will weave in and out of our 
discussion of SPSSI’s activities. 
The former tension, as to the driving force behind SPSSI’s work, relates to 
the scientific debate discussed above between the pure and the applied. Some 
SPSSI members have viewed their work as directed first and foremost by 
science, guided by the idea that only research undertaken from a value-neutral 
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perspective can yield true and therefore useful results. For this school, purity of 
research enables application. Its opposers, like Morawski, would dispute the 
possibility of value-neutral science, and argue instead for value-driven science. 
Social need, as defined by the scientist, thus dictates the work he should 
undertake. This debate differs from the pure vs. applied debates discussed 
above in that both sides are in favor of applying the results they discover. The 
question, rather, is the source of the impetus for undertaking the research in the 
first place. 
The latter tension relates to how SPSSI should act upon the information it 
gleans. Conservative voices have argued for a top-down reform guided by 
scientific experts with knowledge and also, for some, by political or monied 
parties with power. In contrast, the more liberal radical members have called for 
grass-roots action. Between scientific neutrality and value-driven research; 
between elitism and populism, SPSSI has walked a rugged line. 
Both of these tensions plagued SPSSI’s founders even before the society 
existed. SPSSI’s first president, Goodwin Watson, originally left the clergy to 
become a psychologist because he saw in that latter profession as a more 
effective way to “change the world” and build a “new, more humane society.” By 
the 1930s, Watson had grown frustrated with the isolation and impracticality of 
academic psychology, as well as its apparent apathy in the face of the country’s 
rapidly deteriorating economic conditions. In the wake of the Great Depression, 
Watson called upon his colleagues, particularly those in the field of social 
psychology, to use their knowledge to lead the way to social change. As Ian 
Nicholson describes in his biography of Watson, “instead of regarding 
themselves as dispassionate observers of objective truth, Watson urged his 
colleagues to regard themselves as politically committed activists” (Nicholson, 
1997, 40). Firmly planted on the side of valued and active science, Watson 
opposed the passive, neutral science of his day. 
At a 1934 meeting of the American Psychological Association – until then 
primarily a professional and scientific organization - Watson first proposed the 
promotion of a social psychology that could facilitate relief efforts, adult 
education, community organization, and labor struggles, among other activities. 
In September of 1936, after circulating a proposal to the 700 youngest members 
of the society, Watson and a group of co-founders led a meeting for the 
hundreds interested. SPSSI was founded as an independent organization of 
young, mostly social psychologists, under a petition announcing that it would 
“work effectively for both the immediate and ultimate freedom of psychology to 
do its utmost to make contemporary American society intelligible to its 
members, and to suggest and test hypotheses regarding social change” (qtd in 
Nicholson, 1997, p.41). Already in this earliest statement, the tension of the 
“why,” between value-driven social commitment and pure scientific study, is 
clearly visible. The “how” is left more ambiguous.  
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Likewise, the circular sent out to all APA members following this meeting 
emphasized both social and the scientific starting points, calling for the support 
of any psychologist “who believes that realistic research in social psychology 
should be encouraged and that the scientific study of human behavior might 
render greater service than it has in the past to wise statesmanship” (Krech and 
Cartwright, 1956, p.471). The latter phrase alludes to the tension in the “how” of 
SPSSI’s work, in this case reflecting more elitist and conservative tendencies. 
The tension between social and scientific orientations has been reflected in 
more explicit disputes throughout SPSSI’s history. At first, Watson and his 
colleagues had called for the abandonment of value-neutrality and the 
championing of social goals (Nicholson, 1997). Then, too, SPSSI’s first 
publication, Industrial Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation (1936) professed 
not only a socialist platform – the dominant politics among SPSSI members at 
the time – but also a strident critique of liberal social science as well as of the 
very possibility of an objective science (Finison 1986; Nicholson,1997). But the 
organization’s growth to include more conservative psychologists over time 
frustrated such radical efforts, gradually shifting the focus to socially-oriented 
but allegedly value-neutral research. As Benjamin Harris, former chair of 
SPSSI’s History Task Force, has written, “for every early SPSSI leader who 
rejected positivism as elitist and reactionary, there was another who hoped to 
build social psychology into a positivist science for judging political values and 
determining the direction for social change” (Harris, 1986, p.10). 
Alongside the debate over the “why” lay that over the “how:” whether SPSSI 
was a populist or an elitist organization.12 Was social change to be effected by 
enlightened scientists? Or did scientists stand level with the average citizen in 
promoting progress? As Harris asserts, “most relevant to an understanding of 
SPSSI’s complicated politics is [its] combination of a populist view of social 
change with an elitist notion of the role of the social scientist” (Harris, 1986, 
p.12). Those committed to a more conservative scientific viewpoint were often, 
but not always, those advocating SPSSI’s role as a group of leading experts. 
Likewise, those in favor of more socially active agenda were more often the 
populists, though there were exceptions here, too. In the words of former 
society president Medick, “it is not whether psychology (i.e., SPSSI) should 
address significant social problems and attempt to solve them. It is the question 
of how to do it that baffles.” From the pure to the applied, the elitist to the 
populist, SPSSI’s history has been marked by continual debate over its 
philosophical and political orientation. 
                                            
12  In SPSSI’s early years, this controversy paralleled that over the ideas of John Dewey, who 
argued in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s that while science seemed to be becoming more 
and more removed from public life, scientists could alter that trend and use science to 
encourage democracy and openness in public life (Jessica Wang, 2002). 
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All of the various positions have stood united, however, in certain 
fundamental values and goals. It is these shared commitments that have held 
the society together for more that 75 years, and which justify its present 
characterization as an organization promoting many values which we today 
associate with civil society. Such values include a commitment to public 
education; to the social inclusion of marginalized groups; to the defense of civil 
liberties; to connecting the individual to the group; and to respectful social 
discourse. I will examine its successes in each of these realms below. 
But the society was not always successful in promoting its social vision. 
Perhaps more often than not, its efforts were frustrated by various forces: state, 
market, civic, or, indeed, by science itself. Almost all longitudinal examinations 
of SPSSI’s history, including that written only twenty years after its founding by 
two of its earliest members (Krech and Cartwright, 1956), trace a downward 
trend in social activism and an upward trend in reformist scientific activity. 
SPSSI, most conclude, has become an organization dedicated to reform led by 
experts rather than to grass-roots social change by informed citizens. While this 
trend is in part attributable to the changing politics of SPSSI’s membership, 
such shifting politics may themselves be traced to more fundamental challenges 
to SPSSI’s social activism. These challenges should be of critical interest to the 
civil society endeavor, for they represent impediments to the cultivation of a 
society of socially-active institutions. The second part of this article will trace 
some exemplary challenges posed to SPSSI’s efforts from each realm – state, 
market, civil society, and science itself – in order to more precisely illuminate 
such obstacles. 
To identify SPSSI’s shift toward reformism is not to deride all that it 
continues to achieve. This article rather uses SPSSI as a case study of an 
organization dedicated to furthering values central to a civil society, but 
entangled in the paradoxes inherent in the position of a socially-engaged 
organization empowered by an autonomous scientific sphere. This paper will 
first examine SPSSI’s successes in advancing values associated with 
contemporary notions of civil society, and will then survey the challenges 
presented to its work by the other social spheres. Internal tensions about the 
how and the why of SPSSI recur throughout the study. Perhaps the greatest 
lesson to be drawn from SPSSI’s history about the maintenance of an 
organization committed to civil society is the need for the constant reevaluation 
by its members of the organization’s trends. SPSSI’s own members have been 
among its harshest critics; precisely that critical stance has kept it afloat amidst 
the rough waves of attack presented by other social spheres. I return to this 
point below. 
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Exemplary Interventions 
Even its toughest critics allow that SPSSI has had some remarkable successes 
in its efforts to effect social change. This section surveys SPSSI’s expressed 
commitment to and successful activities in five areas congenial to modern 
conceptions of civil society: 1) the inclusion of marginalized groups; 2) 
engagement in respectful public discourse; 3) public education; 4) connecting 
the individual to the group; and 4) the defense of individual civil liberties. Its 
goals are twofold: first, to legitimate SPSSI’s categorization as an association 
committed to the values of civil society in both its actions and its expressed 
intentions; and second, to study its more successful interventions in the civil 
society realm. 
Inclusion of Marginalized Groups  
Recent characterizations of civil society have emphasized the importance of 
both social inclusion as a positive value and exclusion as a negative value. The 
“liberal” vision of civil society, focused on the protection of individual freedoms, 
emphasizes equality of rights and opportunities of all tolerant members of 
society, regardless of race, religion, or any other dividing factor. The only limit to 
such inclusion is intolerance, a position which automatically precludes an 
individual from respectful social participation. On the other hand, the 
“democratic” vision of social society requires active engagement by all 
members. To that end, inclusion of different viewpoints is a positive value, a 
pre-requisite for a thriving social space. As John Hall has stated in his 
evaluation of the failure of civil society in the ideologically homogenous soviet 
bloc, “social diversity is a necessary condition for civil society” (Hall, 2000, 
p.52). In the former Soviet Union, social atomism was so strong that “now there 
are often no groups able to represent interests, thereby ruling out of bounds the 
very notion of social bargaining on which the consolidation of democracy 
depends” (Hall, 2000, p.53). Frank Trentmann has likewise argued for the 
critical importance of social inclusion in the formation of civil society, calling for 
a critical examination of the ways in which “civil” institutions like exclusive 
groups have themselves been the perpetrators of intolerance (Trentmann, 
2000). 
Foucault and others of the anti-psychiatry school have long charged that 
psychology has been responsible for the systematic exclusion of certain voices 
from the social space, justifying such exclusion on scientific grounds. 
Homosexuals, aggressive women, and people of many races and religion have 
all been accused at various points in the history of psychiatry of mental illness 
or impairment, and on those grounds banished from active social participation. 
Commitment to an asylum served as a means of literally banishing undesirables 
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from society and coercing acceptance of certain norms of social behavior. Even 
those whom all might agree are mentally disturbed are said to have been 
excluded by the stigma of a psychologist’s diagnosis. Though these claims are 
severely overdrawn and maliciously painted, there is a good deal of truth to its 
most basic historical claim. Intentionally or not – if one can even speak of intent 
in this anachronistic retrospective manner - psychologists have been partially 
responsible for the social marginalization of all of these groups. 
In light of this claim, SPSSI’s efforts toward social inclusion are all the more 
remarkable. As SPSSI member Dorris Miller has asserted, “the quintessential 
difference between SPSSI and other psychological organizations at the time [of 
its founding] was one of orientation: the elitist orientation of the other 
organizations served to screen populations out of opportunity; SPSSI’s 
orientation sought to screen people in” (Miller, 1986, p.128; emphasis in 
original). Initially, these efforts were directed at the poor, as SPSSI led efforts to 
organize indigent “underclass” workers into labor unions in the wake of the 
Great Depression (Nicholson, 1997). By 1938 the inclusive scope had 
broadened, and SPSSI passed its first bigotry-oriented resolution protesting 
racial psychology (Mednick, 1984, p.164). That same year, SPSSI members 
spoke up on behalf of their fellow psychologists who would be excluded from 
the Twelfth Annual International Congress were it to be held in Vienna, as 
proposed. Austria had just been annexed by the Nazis, and so Jewish 
psychologists would not be allowed to attend. SPSSI members passed a 
resolution protesting the Congress’s change of location. Its stance eventually 
convinced its larger, more powerful parent organization, the APA, to pass a 
similar resolution (Krech and Cartwright, 1956, p.42; Mednick, 1984, p.164). 
From World War II until today, SPSSI has championed the causes of civil 
rights, feminism, and the rights of homosexuals. These efforts took place at the 
state, civil society and internal levels. At the state level, SPSSI members 
prepared the social scientists’ brief used in Brown vs Board of Education, the 
seminal 1954 Supreme Court trial that outlawed segregation in American 
schools. At the civil society level, SPSSI issued its own public statements 
condemning desegregation and race differences, and supported research on 
both.13 For example, in 1955 the society gave out several $1000 awards for 
research on desegregation. It later similarly supported the women’s movement 
and research on gender differences. Internally, SPSSI sought to support the 
expansion of psychology’s professional ranks to include women, Native 
Americans, Asian-Americans, and gays through grants to groups of each as 
well as public support for their efforts (Capshew and Laszlo, 1986; Mednick, 
                                            
13  The latter research-oriented efforts reflected a larger move within psychology to examine 
such questions as the psychological sources of stereotyping and exclusion. Demonized by 
the antipsychiatry movement, psychology began to prove itself a more complexly oriented 
field than its critics asserted (Herman, 1995, p.6). 
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1984).14 From the legal to the social to the professional arenas, SPSSI actively 
promoted, and continues to promote, the inclusion and equality of socially 
marginalized groups. 
 
Respectful Public Discourse  
Habermas and others have described respectful public discourse as the 
lifeblood of civil society. Such discourse involves a reciprocal exchange, 
dependent upon the mutual recognition of the rights and intelligence of the 
other. Most interactions of scientists with society are therefore not discourse, 
but education, which has its own role in the civil society scheme, addressed 
below. I here examine SPSSI’s commitment not to education but to respectful 
exchange. 
As we have seen, tensions between SPSSI’s populist and elitist 
orientations have been an integral part of the society since its inception. The 
history of psychology as a whole has been split between demonizations of 
psychologist’s authoritarian manipulation of society and idealizations of their 
liberating treatment of the mad as equals. Only recently have historians begun 
to challenge both approaches in favor of a more nuanced middle ground. As 
Ellen Herman has written in this vein, “some of the [20th c psychological experts] 
treated society as a sick patient in need of cure. Others treated individuals, 
seeking to induce personal adjustment and growth…but all were involved in 
forms of human management that made the difference between unethical 
manipulation and enlightened facilitation appear vague – that is, when the 
difference was noticed at all” (Herman, 1995, 12). There are no obvious good 
guys or bad guys in this post-Manichean approach to the history of psychology. 
Given this very slippery distinction between manipulation and facilitation, 
however, we may still distinguish among the attitudes brought to any particular 
interaction by individual psychologists. Some have praised SPSSI’s founders for 
their remarkable respect for the laity, apparent in the language used in their 
earliest memos and letters. “At its inception, SPSSI could be differentiated from 
other psychological organization[s] on the basis of its intended audience,” 
Morawski has written. “Some early members described their audiences not in 
terms of a naïve or helpless laity but as potential peers in a mission of enacting 
social change” (Morawski, 1986, p.120; Miller, 1986). These SPSSI scientists 
saw themselves as partners with citizens in a common mission: the desire for 
healthy social existence.  
                                            
14  As per de Toqueville, SPSSI thus served as a training ground for the application of values its 
members advocated for society as a whole. I return to this idea at the end of the article. 
 21 
This attitude of partnership on the part of some SPSSI members is further 
manifested in their respect for knowledge systems other than the scientific. The 
scientist brought his own expertise to the table, not to dictate action but to 
exchange ideas in a democratic fashion. As Morawski has found, “early SPSSI 
documents also contain some criticisms of the empowered stance of scientism 
that placed scientific rationality above other knowledge systems, including 
democracy, and the scientist’s observations above the nonscientists…[Its 
research] implied respect for the knowledge of ordinary beings and belief that 
this knowledge was corrective, enhancing, and necessary” (Morawski, 1986, 
p.122; emphasis in original). In one early edition of the society’s journal, the 
editor asks for feedback from teachers on a classroom curriculum published in a 
prior edition. This sort of give and take, a democratic exchange as opposed to 
an authoritarian dictation, is precisely in line with the Habermasian model of civil 
society.15 
It is, however, anathema to many scientists, for whom scientific authority is 
autocratic. Western science (including that of civil society) places an exclusive 
premium on objective, rational study. Within it, one cannot simply vote on truth. 
And thus, as we have seen, many - if not most - in SPSSI professed more elitist 
positions with respect to their intended audiences. Watson himself “repeatedly 
maintained that the public was unable to perceive the reality of the social 
situation.” Only social scientists and some enlightened individuals could do that. 
The psychologist’s role was to “instruct the general public as to where their real 
interests lay” (Nicholson, 1997, p.55). Watson advocated a socially-active 
science, but not a democratic one. Another founder of SPSSI expressed this 
position, which he shared, in a magazine interview as the need for psychology 
to “save a nation from moral, economic, and cultural disaster [through] a 
scientific reexamination of fundamental principles and concepts of the social 
order” (Van de Water, 1936; qtd in Harris, 1986, 11).  
But even when dominant within the organization, these top-down visions 
neither negate nor invalidate the coexisting strain of respect for the laity noted 
by Morawski and others, sometimes coexisting within the same individual. 
Rather, SPSSI’s elitism must be understood in its historical context. As society 
historian Harris has written, “To say that SPSSI was dedicated to the cause of 
reformism guided by experts is not to disparage SPSSI or to trivialize its past. 
Rather it is to identify SPSSI’s reformism as part of an ideology of social 
                                            
15  One might object that I only consider one half of this discursive equation, not asking whether 
the laity to whom SPSSI scientists speak share their respectful approach. My apparent elitist 
assumption that non-scientists will always respect scientific opinion is rather an artifact of 
ignorance: I have no comprehensive information on the range of attitudes with which 
SPSSI’s work has been received. Later I consider challenges posed to its efforts by non-
scientists on an incidental basis that might be takent to indicate a lack of respect. I am here 
concerned specifically with the intentions and attitudes of SPSSI itself in establishing the 
legitimacy of its classification as an organization dedicated to advancing civil society. 
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science that dominated United States political and social thought beginning in 
the 1920s, and that gave SPSSI its qualities of radicalism and conservatism, 
activism and scientism, populism and elitism” (Harris, 1986, p.11). In this 
context, expert-led reform was the dominant progressive vision. Unusual was 
not such elitism, but, rather, the respect for citizens which has coexisted with it 
in SPSSI’s philosophy since its founding. As Herman notes, “distinctions 
between democratic and anti-democratic uses of knowledge have changed over 
time; the line separating them has a great deal more to do with the social 
context of ideas than with factors intrinsic to knowledge production” (Herman, 
1995, p.11). If much of SPSSI’s early work appears, today, undemocratic in 
practice, the presence of ideas which do conform to modern notions of 
democracy and exchange is all the more remarkable for it.  
The paradox of the normative social science of the rational is inescapable. 
Even the most liberal scientists bring a confidence in their own methods to the 
table, else they would not be there to begin with. The question is, rather, what 
do they expect to take anything away from the table in return? 
Public Education  
Education has been considered one of the core values of civil society ever since 
its formulation during the Enlightenment. Kant, Mendelssohn, de Toqueville, 
Hegel – all emphasized knowledge as a prerequisite for fruitful, reasoned civic 
discourse. For Enlightenment thinkers, state protection of individual rights, 
liberties and security would allow for the emergence of a new social reality in 
which, in the words of historian Jurgen Kocka, “work, achievement, and success 
– not birth and privilege – should determine the distribution of wealth, status, 
and power. Education should be of the utmost importance. The public use of 
reason should replace legitimation by tradition” (Kocka, 1997, pp.499). 
The Marxist disillusionment with this vision saw in society not reason but 
coercion. Education was merely one means of that coercion. Gramsci, 
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse all bemoaned the society’s deterioration into 
a mass fooled into thinking that the actions it undertook in the name of state and 
market were in fact products of its own volition (Gramsci, 1971; Horkheimer and 
Adorno, 1995; Marcuse, 1966). Horkheimer and Adorno denounced rationality 
in modern society as instrumental, a means of forwarding capitalism rather than 
of inspiring individual reflection. Such reason in fact inhibits individuals from 
making their own judgments (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1995). Herbert Marcuse 
similarly charged that technological rationality, the rationality of the 
technological market and culture, has become political rationality. Thought, 
reason, speech, and civil liberties – the prized possessions of civil society - are 
therefore used to support, and not to challenge, the existing order. Education 
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likewise only exists to further that order. For Marcuse, not truth but exchange 
value is the object of dispute in the social arena (Marcuse, 1995).  
But just as people can be “educated” – in the sense of trained - to use false 
reason, so, too, can education point the way to more active and critical civic 
engagement. While Horkheimer and Adorno articulated this hope long ago, 
Habermas is today the most prominent spokesman for the call for the return of 
educated, reasoned, critical discourse. We have seen already that respect is 
one pre-requisite for this discourse. Education is another. Habermas has 
described the original evolution of a realm of reasoned discourse as a result of 
the sharing of knowledge and information amongst a reading public (Habermas, 
1989, p.367; Habermas, 1996). But the critical, rational nature of that discourse 
was lost over time as class concerns came to the fore, monopolizing knowledge 
exchange. Habermas has today called for a return to that society of shared 
knowledge and reasoned discourse which can maintain the necessary critical 
distance from market concerns. Habermas’ is an optimistic vision – a naïve one, 
according to his critics - grounded in a deep faith in the power of accurately 
informed human reason to prevail over other forces.  
The founders of SPSSI shared his optimism, and like Habermas recognized 
the critical link between reasoned discussion and the sharing of knowledge. 
Fully one half of its original mission statement was directed at public education, 
and retains equal treatment in the society’s current mission statement:  
[SPSSI seeks to promote]…a psychology to do its utmost to make 
contemporary American society intelligible to its members (1936; qtd in 
Morawski, 1986 and Nicholson, 1997). 
This Society…shall engage in activities to instruct the public on 
subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community (1) by 
obtaining, and disseminating to the public factual data regarding social 
change and other social processes through the promotion and 
encouragement of psychological research on significant theoretical and 
practical questions of social life… (2002, wwww.spssi.org). 
The society’s original rhetoric about education was even couched largely in the 
Marxist terms proposed by Adorno and Horkheimer, subsumed under what 
Nicholson calls conscientization, or “the effort to enlighten men about the 
obstacles preventing them from a clear perception of reality [including] cultural 
myths which confuse people’s awareness” (Nicholson, 1997, p.41). For Watson 
and others of his ilk, the cultural myth from which the public had to be freed was 
capitalism, unjust and exploitative. Psychologists must, Watson felt, “help the 
average citizen see through the efforts to misconstrue our economic and 
political predicament” and thereby precipitate social change (Watson; qtd in 
Nicholson, 1997, pp.41-2). Today no such Marxist emphasis remains in 
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SPSSI’s efforts, but the tradition has left its mark in the rhetoric of 
consciousness-raising and public awareness (Capshew, 1986, p.101). 
While public education in the abstract has never been a point of 
controversy within SPSSI, the best means of attaining it has. In the society’s 
earliest days, it drew upon standard academic forms of publication – books, 
journals, pamphlets, press releases – to convey knowledge and information. Of 
course, such publications generally remained removed from the public at whom 
they were directed. A slightly later approached centered upon the publication of 
materials that would directly affect education. For example, in the 1950s the 
society prepared two books worth of supplementary readings for the standard 
college psychology course, one on current research in social psychology and 
the other on propaganda and public opinion, a hot topic in Cold War America 
(Krech and Cartwright, 1956, p.472). Sometimes, outside agencies would 
approach SPSSI in search of social psychology materials that could illuminate 
their efforts. For example, in response to the request of a group of “action 
agencies,” and funded by UNESCO, ADL, and National Conference of 
Christians and Jews, SPSSI prepared the two-volume Research Methods in 
Social Relations. 
Such publications continued throughout the century, and today the society 
continues to publish the Journal of Social Issues, books, its newsletter, 
pamphlets and a new electronic journal. The latter three have today been made 
even more accessible through the rise of the internet, allowing the casual surfer 
to pause for a few moments of education about such topics as the psychology 
of terrorism. Some of SPSSI’s critics charge that it lacks a true agenda today. 
Whether or not that is the case, it has certainly continued in its agenda of 
helping others pursue their social goals. The latest pamphlet on the site, 
“Principles for Promoting Social Change,” attests not merely to SPSSI’s 
commitment to attain its ends in a means congenial to civil society, but also to 
its commitment toward the promotion of that society in and of itself. The 
pamphlet describes, for any interested, the social psychological principles that 
might be of use to anyone hoping to further a social cause 
(http://www.spssi.org/ppsc.html). Its authors offer a “four-step model” for 
effecting social change, assuring their readers that: 
The principles discussed can be a powerful tool to help promote your 
cause, be it the guiding ideas for a letter to the editor or an entire 
campaign effort. The cause you support is worthy of the public's 
attention, but gaining that attention, let alone eliciting active 
participation, is not always a smooth task. It is an important task, 
however, and this booklet provides a guide to help make that task 
easier. Following the four-step method and using the principles 
discussed can be effective in influencing social change and making the 
world a better place to live (http://www.spssi.org/ppsc.html). 
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As this guide to social activism reveals, the society is committed not only to 
educating the public about its own studies, but also to directing the studies 
themselves toward furthering an active discursive realm. 
While the internet technology employed by SPSSI today is new, the 
philosophy behind its use is not. SPSSI has long sought ways to educate the 
public directly and not through any political or mass media intermediary. John 
Keane has analyzed the public sphere into three sub-spheres: the micro-public 
sphere, in which hundreds to thousands interact at a sub-state level; the meso-
public sphere, in which millions interact as a nation, and the macro-public 
sphere, in which millions or billions interact at the global international level, with 
mass media playing a role at every step (Keane, 1998, p.182). SPSSI’s efforts 
have always occurred at the micro-public level, if not the micro-micro public 
level, in face-to-face groups of tens and twenties. As society historian Harris 
describes, its presentation at the 1939 world’s fair showed that “SPSSI not only 
felt compelled to educate the public about the evils of war, facism, and 
monopoly capitalism, but to do so directly rather than by using the allegedly 
reactionary mass media” (Harris, 1986, 9). Writing classroom curricula, 
publishing textbooks, planning public presentations, and, today, making 
literature available online are just a few of the ways in which the society has 
sought to directly educate the public about psychology’s socially relevant 
findings.  
Has it worked? Twenty years after the society’s founding Krech and 
Cartwright evaluated the success of its educational program. “Today, many 
more people have heard of social psychology, and many practical men believe 
that it can contribute to the solution of problems; but at the same time we note a 
general decrease since the 30’s in social tolerance of concern with really 
controversial issues. SPSSI still has something to do” (Krech and Cartwright, 
1956, p.472). In 2002, the importance and relevance of psychological findings is 
beyond dispute. Schools, agencies, and policy-makers alike consult 
psychologists at every critical step. Public discourse is if anything so infused 
with psychological language that it is beyond notice. But, as Krech and 
Cartwright noted in 1956, and as their followers echo to this day, “SPSSI still 
has something to do.” Indeed, education is an unending project. Psychology 
has not unseated what Horkheimer and Adorno would call passive or 
instrumental reason. In many cases, in fact, education is invoked in its name. At 
any given point, educational “success” can only be measured by comparison to 
that of some prior period, as well as by the level of continued commitment to the 
educational project. SPSSI’s educational activity relative to earlier periods is 
harder to determine. Has an increasingly conservative political agenda induced 
a more conservative educational approach? Or is the society as educationally 
active as ever, just toward less radical ends? While these remain open 
questions within the society itself, the continuity of that debate indicates its 
persistent commitment to the value of education. 
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The Individual and the Group  
As an organization of mostly social psychologists, SPSSI has, as we have seen, 
long been dedicated to the researching and application of ideas about groups, 
not individuals. It might be expected that this occurs to the exclusion of work on 
individual psychology, and to some extent this has been the case. However, in 
its efforts to promote a free and liberal society, SPSSI has throughout its history 
been attuned to the potential for the violation of the rights of the individual by 
the group, as explained in the civil liberties section below; to the individual’s 
inclusion by the group, as discussed in that section above; and to the 
individual’s ability to shape his own group, as evidenced by such empowering 
publications and educational efforts as the “Principles for Promoting Social 
Change” pamphlet mentioned earlier. This section will not review these various 
manifestations of SPSSI’s concern for the individual, as they are detailed 
elsewhere it other capacities. It seeks, rather, to highlight an element common 
to each – concern for the place of the individual within the group - and to relate 
that element to larger debates within the fields of both civil society and 
psychology. 
The balance between the group and the individual, not merely in terms of 
liberty but also in terms of identity, is critical to contemporary discussions of civil 
society in light of the critiques offered by Richard Sennett. Sennett has argued 
that today’s society is too concerned with the self to care for the social, resulting 
in an “ideology of intimacy: social relationships of all kinds are real, believable, 
and authentic the closer they approach the inner psychological concerns of 
each person. This ideology transmutes political categories into psychological 
categories” (Sennett, 1978. p 259). The result of this transmution, in Sennett’s 
estimation, has been an apathy toward social relationships.  
Herman has echoed this critique in her assessment of modern American 
society as increasingly self-isolating. “Many people have willingly severed the 
self from its social ecology,” she writes. “Feelings of powerlessness against 
those conditions that shape the self – from mind-numbing corporate 
depersonalization to the violence ever-present on city streets – have nurtured 
forms of vehement individualism and elicited desperate hopes that the self can 
be nurtured and managed at a social distance, out of harm’s way.”  
The resulting aversion to the group is obviously disastrous for any vision of 
civil society which relies upon association and social networks. The rise of a 
psychological culture has been blamed for this increasing isolation, but that 
claim takes a very narrow view of psychological theory. As Herman points out, 
“the fundamental knowledge that no self exists, except in relation to others and 
in the context of social reality, survives at the very heart of psychological 
knowledge itself” (Herman, 1995, p.2). Social psychologists like those who 
created and still support SPSSI are particularly attuned to this relationship, and 
 27 
to the fundamental sociality of all human existence. Herman notes this nuance 
in her evaluation of the the rise of psychological experts and their contribution to 
the current self-oriented culture: 
The public consequences of psychological expertise during [the 
twentieth century] were characteristically mixed and contradictory – 
sometimes repressive and deserving of condemnation, sometimes 
inspiring people to move boldly in pursuit of personal freedom and 
social justice. The popularization of psychological vocabulary and the 
public appearance of a language of subjectivity do not necessarily 
prove the seamlessness of elite domination or the existence of a tidal 
wave of false consciousness that blocks progressive change by 
simultaneously corroding the self and making it the subject of almost 
obsessive attention. Inclinations toward personal growth, self esteem, 
and pleasure can form the basis for new concepts of community and 
collective action even as they rationalize isolated programs of individual 
self-improvement (Herman, 1995, p.16). 
A direct correlation cannot be drawn, then, between professional psychology 
and the interiorization of society. If socially-active psychologists have employed 
terminology and ideas that explain the relationship of the individual to the group, 
they have not reduced the former to the latter. One of Herman’s central 
conclusions, in fact, is that “psychological experts have been a critical force in 
the recent convergence between private and public domains, cultural and 
political concerns. Joining the comprehension and change of self to the 
comprehension and change of society was their most enduring legacy” 
(Herman, 1995, 12).  
This union is critical to the civil society project. While civil and state 
organizations can work to safeguard the individual’s rights from violation by a 
group, they cannot force an individual to actively associate with others as the 
civil society models require. Many of the models which rely on group 
interactions have therefore been critiqued as offering an inadequate explanation 
of the cause for association. Through their research and educational work on 
the inherent connections between the self and society, active social 
psychologists like those in SPSSI have promoted a message of affiliation, not 
isolation.  
Defense of Civil Liberties 
But SPSSI members have been attuned to the opposite danger as well: that of 
such total affiliation that individual’s rights stand vulnerable to violation by the 
group. SPSSI has long defended civil liberties against such violation, and is 
known within the psychological community for that work. The group first began 
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to champion civil liberties of necessity more than choice, as its own members’ 
and colleagues’ academic freedoms were challenged in Communist-phobic 
America.  
The first such challenge came in 1937, when Dr. Ellis Freeman, SPSSI 
member and a psychologist at the University of Louisville, was investigated by a 
private right-wing group known as the American Legion. In America at this time, 
private and state groups alike worked to root out Communist influences from 
mainstream society. In response to his investigation, Freeman filed a civil suit to 
defend his reputation. The presiding judge found that “Dr. Freeman is a public 
servant in a public instituition supported by public taxes. He has no privacy to 
violate…These gentleman of the American Legion did nothing any citizen 
doesn’t have the right to do; they inquired into the character and record of a 
teacher and the things he taught our young people. They are to be 
commended.” (Krech and Cartwright, 1956, p.473; Sargent and Harris, 1986, 
p.45). The dangerous precedent set by the finding would make it even easier for 
such investigations to be conducted in the future. 
At an SPSSI council meeting held in response to the judge’s decision, 
members issued a statement condemning the finding as “potentially dangerous 
to civil liberties of the teacher and research worker.” The meeting minutes 
record that the council instructed its secretary to communicate with ACLU about 
the trial. Nothing came of that communication. Similar attempts to protest 
SPSSI member Isador Krechevsky’s professional demotion because he was a 
Jew likewise met with little success. SPSSI’s earliest attempts to defend civil 
liberties were yet feeble (Sargent and Harris, 1986).  
Throughout the 40s and 50s, such attempts continued and grew more 
effective. When Columbia University fired SPSSI member George Hartmann for 
being a conscientious objector to World War II, SPSSI launched its own private 
investigion and helped fund the breach of contract suit which he eventually won 
(Sargent and Harris, 1986). SPSSI’s civil rights activism and its other efforts to 
defend minorities’ rights mentioned earlier in the section on inclusion and 
exclusion might also be recalled here. 
But the group’s successes in this area have been uneven. As I discuss in 
some detail below, the society was helpless in defending former society 
president Watson against both civil and state prosecutions for communist 
sympathies. These experiences further served to disillusion the idealistic society 
with its initial assumptions of the inviolability of certain freedoms. The Cold War 
era permanently added the defense of civil liberties to the society’s agenda. By 
1950, the society had already committed to the cause monetarily, forming an 
academic freedom fund that could help those whose liberties had been violated 
defend selves in a court of law. The issue became prominent enough for social 
psychologists in general that in 1954, Gordon Allport, one of the first historians 
 29 
of social psychology, wrote that the field’s central question at that time was 
“how is it possible to preserve the values of freedom and individual rights under 
mounting conditions of social strain and regimentation?” (Allport, 1954, p.4). 
While no longer a central focus of social psychology per se, this question is still 
critical to SPSSI’s work, as well as for the civil society endeavor. The paradox of 
open affiliation is inherent in the visions of both. 
We have seen, then, that SPSSI was dedicated to and successful in 
promoting at least five issues critical to contemporary models of civil society: 
inclusion of marginalized groups; respectful public discourse; public education; 
the relationship of the individual to the group; and the defense of civil liberties. 
As a socially active association committed to these values, it provides a useful 
empirical model for civil society studies. In the next section, I examine the 
challenges posed to the work of such an organization by other social spheres.  
Challenges to SPSSI’s Efforts 
In his proposal for the investigation of the interactions of civil society with a 
variety of other social spheres, civil society researcher Jeffrey Alexander 
suggests that the interplay between any two spheres can be described in terms 
of “facilitating inputs, destructive intrusions, and civil repairs” (Alexander, 1998, 
pp.8). While conservative theorists, he writes, as well as the elites in any one 
sphere, would be inclined to emphasize that sphere’s facilitating inputs to the 
civil sphere, leftists would focus instead on the damaging incursions of such 
spheres into the civil space. He concludes that “neither side of this argument 
can be ignored in the effort to theorize the relation between civil society and 
other kinds of social institutions in a general way” (Alexander, 1998, pp.8). 
If the previous section of this article focused on the “facilitating inputs” of 
one organization within the scientific sphere into civil society, this section 
focuses on the destructive incursions not by that same society but into it. 
Throughout its history, SPSSI’s work to promote the values of a civil society has 
met with challenges from every other sphere: market, state, civil society, and 
even science itself. I here examine the sorts of challenges posed by each 
sphere, concluding with a look at the challenges posed internally by SPSSI’s 
own members. In every case except the latter, this challenge came in the form 
of a threat by the power of each sphere to SPSSI’s alleged inherent source of 
power, scientific authority. This analysis reveals both the fragile nature of that 
authority, as well as the threats to civically-oriented work that can be expected 
by any similarly oriented society, whatever its source of influence.  
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Challenges from the Market  
Many today are still naïve enough to believe scientific work isolated from the 
pressures of the market so evident in all other areas of society. While the 
market influence is less obvious in the scientific world, particularly in the purely 
research as opposed to commercially or politically oriented realms, it is still a 
critical force. Until scientists stop needing to eat, they will always be influenced 
by the market forces.  
Given its own later bowing to market forces, it is ironic that SPSSI was first 
formed in large part to protect psychologists and others from the market forces 
that devastated America during the Great Depression. As hard economic times 
often breed association, it was not alone. In the words of a 1939 editorial, “in the 
cellar of the great Depression, new organizations sprouted like mushrooms” 
(New America, 1939; qtd in Harris, 1986, p.1).  
Aside from working to protect jobs, form unions, and support the 
unemployed – goals common to many of the newly formed groups - more 
radical SPSSI members hoped to help society identify and overcome the 
pervasive market influences that left no social space untouched. Leaders like 
Goodwin Watson and George Hartmann believed that the greatest threat posed 
by American capitalism was not its manifest instability but, rather, its hidden and 
total impact. They sought not merely the protection of employment rights, but 
rather a complete overhaul of all major institutions affecting social identity 
(Harris, 1986, 12). This attitude is reflected in such works Industrial Conflict, the 
Marxist society publication mentioned above (Finison, 1986; Nicholson, 1997). 
This radical strain is important as a point of comparison for the society’s 
later positions. Even at the time of its founding, however, socialists like Watson 
and Hartmann were far from a majority of the society. As society historian Harris 
records, “on the issue of social class and its relevance to the process of political 
change, SPSSI members held both radical and conservative views. While some 
were union activists and most were sympathetic to the plight of the average 
worker, the majority held the opinion that the labor movement would never be 
more than one of the many pressure groups operating in the political arena” 
(Harris, 1986, p.10). The more conservative SPSSI members were therefore 
satisfied with the minimal advances the society was able to make in protecting 
laborers, particularly psychologists. Its work to establish the APA’s Joint 
Committee on Employment was one example of the more moderate steps that 
the society took to address the economic crisis (Miller, 1986, p.128) 
But from the start, the society was subject to the very forces it sought to 
curb. Though it hoped to protect both science and society from determination by 
market forces, even those very efforts required funding. In this plight, the 
society joined psychology as a whole, a field which was just beginning to 
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establish itself in American society in the early decades of this century. Though 
the organization was originally formed to advance a social rather than a 
professional agenda, SPSSI’s social ideals could not isolate it from the 
pressures of professionalization affecting the budding field. As Morawski has 
described, as the profession began to grow, its practitioners realized that 
“psychology would require the kind of financing needed for any laboratory 
science. Psychologists began speaking up about these material requirements, 
turned to government agencies and philanthropic foundations for assistance, or, 
like the founders of the Psychological Corporation, some psychologists 
attempted to reinvest part of the profits from applied work into research 
programs” (Morawski, 1986, p.114). A variety of strategies were thus employed 
toward securing funding for psychological study. In the process, scientific 
independence was sacrificed for that monetary need.  
In turn, that professional positioning required served to legitimate 
psychological authority. By forming networks with schools, businesses, and 
other private and public institutions, psychology insured its own financial 
security even as it gained the respect of those supporting it. The school 
psychologist became a fixture. Managers consulted social psychology for 
insight into controlling employees. Administration and psychology became 
increasingly linked as the profession revealed itself useful in providing new 
ways of calculating and explaining human behavior (Nicholson, 1997, p.42).  
The unfortunate, though not necessarily unavoidable, consequence of 
these growing alliances was a decrease in the distance psychologists could 
maintain from any of the institutions. SPSSI members were among those 
serving as consultants to schools and businesses, and even these more radical, 
socially-active psychologists were affected by financial inertia. Once radical 
leader Goodwin Watson, deeply affected by the political lessons of the personal 
investigations examined below, was chief among their ranks. After World War II, 
Watson devoted his energies not to political activism and social action research, 
but instead to the running of so-called T-groups, focus groups for the highest 
executives in corporate America. He claimed to be continuing in his efforts for 
social change by helping executives become more sensitive to the forces at 
work in group dynamics. Group sessions centered around topics such as “On 
Giving and Receiving Help” and “Improving Interpersonal Perception” 
(Nicholson, 1997, p.54). But even Watson’s professed attitude toward corporate 
heads themselves had changes. Whereas once he had denounced them as 
oppressors of the underclasses, by the 1950s Watson had come to see senior 
executives and their businesses as society’s great hope, as socially-minded 
organizations that could provide workers with a sense of home and care. The 
once-tyrants had now “enlarged their concern not only for workers but for the 
communities in which they operate,” Watson argued. “The higher the level of 
management the greater appears to be the focus on purpose and values…Profit 
is not the only determinant.” (Watson, 1963; qtd in Nicholson, 1997, 54). 
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The genuineness of Watson’s claims is difficult to determine. As we will 
see, during the post-war years Watson grew more conservative in his public 
statements as a result of multiple prosecutions for communist activity. But given 
the increasing numbers of psychologists employed by institutions outside 
science and academia, his shifted sentiments should by no means be 
considered anomalous. Many of SPSSI’s members underwent a similar shift, 
and over the course of the century its market reform activities and educational 
efforts dropped off. SPSSI’s own professional concerns, it seemed, had 
compromised its critical stance: an initially market-wary organization almost 
entirely ceased its activities in that regard. 
Had corporations really changed? Had CEOs become the new social hope, 
as Watson maintained? Or had scientific authority and the socially-active 
agenda of an organization based in it merely fallen prey to an inescapable 
market force? Conservative civil society theorists would assert that while 
perhaps Watson’s view was overly optimistic, capitalism does indeed facilitate 
democratic values, and is in fact inextricable from them. Leftist theorists would 
adopt the opposite position. John Hall has noted the dangers of relying upon the 
market sphere in the construction of civil society given its tendency toward 
political conservatism. “In the face of social protest that causes disruption to 
business and profit,” Hall explains, “capitalists and middle classes more 
generally revert to supporting the party of order. In a nutshell, this segment is 
highly opportunistic and thus not a reliable base on which to build a civil society” 
(Hall, 2000, p.52). Genuine or not, Watson’s vision of dependable corporate 
values is no more than a pipe dream for liberal society theorists.  
Historian Peter Franks’ “A Social History of American Psychology up to the 
Second World War” regards this trend in SPSSI’s history toward corporate 
partnership not as a new development but rather as a fundamental element of 
the organization’s composition. He demonizes SPSSI’s founders as 
manipulative champions of the rich, denouncing social psychology as a whole 
as “reconstructed liberalism’s rationalization and understanding of the change to 
bureaucratic society of controlled consumption” (Franks, 1975). SPSSI uses 
social concern, Franks argues, as a thin veil to conceal its larger project of 
increasing the power of the market and government over the individual. 
Between Franks’ charge that SPSSI has always been a market tool, and 
Watson’s belief that the market could itself become SPSSI’s tool for effecting 
social change, we can surely find some middle ground. The most radical of 
SPSSI’s original positions on economic reform was neither financially tenable 
nor representative of the group as a whole. With time, the organization was 
forced to find ways to support its work, and those professional means 
compromised its ends as originally defined. But there was no mailicious intent to 
the trajectory, as Franks maintains. The society bowed to financial needs, and 
its political agenda was altered as a result. 
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The real question is whether that bowing is a necessary fact of capitalist 
society. Is it possible for organizations – professional or otherwise - to maintain 
a critical distance from the financial institutions which support them? Again, 
leftist theorists would say that it is not. As John Ehrenberg writes, “there is no 
reason to expect that the better argument can prevail in civil societies that are 
so penetrated by the market” (Ehrenberg, 1999, p.224). In this view, an echo of 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Gramsci, Marcuse, and others, rationality is itself a market 
product. The rationality of science would not be immune to this charge. 
SPSSI’s perpetual internal debates about the society’s trend toward market 
cooperation instead of distanced criticism may offer a way out of this pessimistic 
conclusion. Despite its clear shift toward market acceptance, SPSSI’s critical 
strain has persisted throughout its history, in word if not action. Were another 
Great Depression to hit tomorrow, SPSSI would likely resume some form of the 
work organizing economic reform which it began years ago. Less sensationally, 
there is no reason to think that a shift in the orientation of the society’s 
membership could not allow it to regain some of that original critical distance, 
and not even necessarily from any particular political position. Because of its 
emphasis on self-evaluation, SPSSI’s critical tradition has been maintained for 
75 years, contrary to the predictions of the most negative Marxist models. 
Scholars at both ends of the political spectrum might be interested in this 
continuity of a critical tradition, whether or not they support its content. I return 
to this point below. 
Challenges from the State 
At its founding, SPSSI’s leaders envisioned productive interactions with the 
state to effect social change. Watson even cited one of SPSSI’s main 
impetuses for formation as “the need to bring the scientist one step closer to the 
statesman’” (Watson, 1936; qtd in Harris, 1986, 12). While as we have seen 
SPSSI had its share of positive interactions with the state, and was able to 
influence legal and policy decisions, it has been an uneasy relationship. 
Watson’s vision proved greatly naïve, much to his own detriment, as well as to 
that of the society as a whole. 
World War II marked psychology’s entrée into the political world. Heavily 
recruited by the American government to advise officials on wartime domestic 
and foreign policy, psychologists found themselves a numerous population in 
Washington D.C. (Herman, 1995,). It was, in part, a thrilling move, as from the 
seat of power political change could be effected much more quickly and directly. 
Optimistic (and elitist) members of SPSSI saw in that move a new era in 
American society, one in which statesman and scientist would, in fact, work side 
by side (Nicholson, 1997, p.49; Finison, 1986). But that power proved both 
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elusive and expensive. Elusive, because government scientists soon realized 
that their advice might or might not be taken, their words perhaps not even 
recorded, depending on competing political factors. Time and again, the voice 
of science was overpowered by that of state. By the end of the war, SPSSI no 
longer had to worry about how to get psychology into arenas of power. As Ian 
Nicholson, who has studied SPSSI’s, and in particular Watson’s activities during 
this era, explains, “the war had done that for them. What had to be overcome 
was the problematic interface between psychological expertise and policy 
formation” (Nicholson, 1997, 49). 
Political power proved expensive, because not only was science ignored, 
its authority was also challenged, at a significant price to its legitimacy. 
Politically-active scientists, like other activist Americans at the time, were 
treated with great suspiscion by those wary of communist conspiracy. In the 
wartime rush of new Washington employees, many government officials 
became concerned that a Red might be among their numbers. The infamous 
House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) was the Congressional 
body responsible for investigating that possibility, and it left no ruddy stone 
unturned. 
In 1941 Goodwin Watson was offered the job of Chief of the Section on 
Analysis in the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service of the Federal 
Communications Commission. As a socialist, he was opposed to the war. He 
eventually accepted the position, however, for it “offered him in an instant what 
years of unrewarding political struggle had failed to achieve: government 
recognition as an expert and a clear sense of direction” (Nicholson, 43). He 
believed, too, that his scientific knowledge of international psychology uniquely 
qualified him for the job. 
Almost upon arrival in Washington, he learned that he was being 
investigated by the HUAC for participation in communist activities. Texas 
Representative Martin Dies was leading the investigation of 39 government 
officials deemed “irresponsible, unrepresentative, radical and crackpot.” (Dies; 
qtd in Nicholson, 1997, p. 46) As was standard procedure for such 
investigations, the committee performed full background checks on each 
employee, violating individuals’ privacy in the name of national security and the 
defense of the constitutional government. Watson was asked to appear before 
the committee, where he apologized for some of his more radical statements 
and affirmed his love of and loyalty to the USA. He also told investigators that 
his radical leftist views were formed by the Depression and but had changed in 
response to both the Hitler-Stalin pact and the progressive governmental 
reforms of the New Deal. 
In spite of his apology, the Committee concluded that Watson’s 
“membership and association…and views and philosophies expressed in 
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various statements…constitute subversive activity” (qtd in Nicholson, 1997, 
p.46). A rider calling for Watson’s termination was appended to a bill whose 
main content called for the payment of thousands of other federal employees, a 
bill President Roosevelt could not afford to delay. He signed it, but stated that 
he viewed the HUAC rider as “not only unwise and discriminatory, but 
unconstitutional…an unwarranted encroachment upon the authority of both the 
executive and judicial branches” (qtd in Nicholson, 1997, p.47). Watson left 
Washington, his reputation and utopic vision of a scientifically-managed 
democracy both irreparably tarnished. 
During those years, Watson and SPSSI learned how naïve they had been 
about the relationship of science and politics. Any number of political forces 
could and would interfere with the independence of scientific authority. While in 
Washington, Watson reported back from the political jungle as follows: 
“Bumping against controls from his chief, from Civil Service…from jealous 
competitors, from Congressional investigators, and press misinterpretation, the 
innovator, bruised in spirit, gradually subsides intot he approved bureaucratic 
torpor.” (Watson, 1945, 2). It had also been a lesson in democracy. Dies and 
HUAC had been able to impose their will upon an opposed Senate and 
president. As Nicholson relates, the experience “demonstrated conclusively that 
psychological expertise could not function independently of political 
circumstances no matter how incisive it might be. Psychologists had to know 
the system and who was in the system…They needed to realize that the 
relationship between policy implementation and empirical research was in a 
constant state of flux.” (Nicholson, 1997, p.48) 
In the wake of these realizations, SPSSI adopted a much more delicate 
political agenda, and conservative activist approach. In the 1942 yearbook, 
Watson focused on improving morale in labor unions, every proposal to that end 
directed toward federal action rather than at the trade union level (Finison, 
1986). A shift had begun from a focus on more radical action at the grass-roots 
level to more conservative top-down reform, with the scientist above rather than 
alongside the citizen. Shortly before appearing before the HUAC, Watson 
summed up this more cautious, expert-led form of social action in a utopian 
essay on social engineering: “We have a body of technical skills and a growing 
collection of relevant facts obtained from careful research. We make this 
available to responsible authorities, helping them do more quickly, more easily, 
more smoothly, and more effectively the things which it has long been their job 
to do.” (Watson, 1943; qtd. in Nicholson, 1997, p.49). Society members had 
learned that if one is to have a voice at all in the governmental arena, it must be 
as apolitical as possible. Signs of either a specific political agenda, or of the 
desire to effect political change through non-governmental means, would 
disqualify action in the state sphere. 
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This move toward value-neutral science marked a dramatic change for a 
once activist organization. In 1946, David Krech wrote in the society’s journal 
that “in social research the social scientist is the expert on the research 
formulation of the problem, on interpretation, on analysis, on understanding. But 
he must seek the original formulation of his problems from the man of social 
action” (Kretch, 1946, p.4; qtd in Nicholson, 49). Only ten years before, the 
group had been founded as one of formulators, actors, applied scientists. 
Political threats to scientific authority had all but paralyzed those intentions. 
Watson and others were well aware of the shift that had occurred, but felt 
powerless in the face of it. In 1945 he published some of his more tragic 
conclusions about the political process:  
Accomodation to the policies and values of those who make the 
strategic decisions may be slow, but it is insidious and 
inescapable…One can rationalize for a time that compromise at some 
points is necessary for effectiveness at others. After a while the 
compromises are made without even the self-deception that some 
larger good will somehow be served. This leads to the distrust of one’s 
own values, disintegration of character, and the demise of personality 
(Watson, 1945; qtd in Nicholson, 1997, p.56). 
Political reality had crushed Watson’s idealistic fervor. The powers of the state 
had nullified those of science, obstructing SPSSI’s ability to act independently in 
the civic sphere. 
While the extremity and pessimism of this shift did not last much beyond 
the immediately post-war years, many writers on SPSSI’s past view its 
members’ wartime political experiences as a critical turning point in the form 
and content of the organization’s activity. In terms of the scheme proposed 
above, the war shifted the emphasis of both the “why” and the “how” of SPSSI’s 
work. From that time onward, Watson advocated SPSSI’s dissemination of 
value-neutral research about society to those in positions of authority. Research 
was thus to avoid any valued or political motivation, and its results were to be 
implemented from above, not below.  
At the same time, a commitment to social change remained, and the 
tragedy of Watson’s experience gave way to the prevailing optimism of the 
postwar period. Scientists benefited from a tremendous surge in government 
research funding, as well as government interest in the products of that 
research. If SPSSI had become less politically critical, it seemed to have less 
reason to be. The government had provided not only financial support but also 
political support – by publicly affirming its faith in scientific authority, the 
profession seemed to gain much of the power it had lost during the war 
(Morawski, 1986, 121). As Nicholson has written, “society had demonstrated its 
willingness to at least consider putting the society on a scientific footing. Under 
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these circumstances, politically pointed analysis would be anachronistic” 
(Nicholson, 1997, p.55).  
What were the lessons the wartime chapter of SPSSI’s history? First, 
political challenges to scientific authority proved sufficiently powerful to force 
SPSSI into an apolitical position. HUAC was able to intimidate SPSSI severely 
enough that in the postwar era it retreated from its prior political agendas and 
methods. If socially active groups are to be kept from existing at the mercy of 
state power, there must be checks in place to prevent a group’s political 
devastation by the state. While America learned this lesson well as Cold War 
investigations grew unmanageable in the McCarthy era, its experience showed 
that democracy does not by any means ensure the free existence of social 
groups. Any civil society scheme must account for the intrusion of state power 
into that of other spheres to the detriment of the social network. 
Second, in the postwar era, state confidence in science proved that 
government power may be wielded constructively and effectively to aid other 
sectors. State support boosted scientific authority tremendously, an effort which 
likewise restored the faith of scientists in the state which many had just months 
earlier resented for its disregard for civil liberties. Such reciprocal boosting of 
power between state and civil-society-oriented groups is ideal. Only as public 
and state confidence in scientific efforts was restored could SPSSI and 
organizations resume the social activism they had been too intimidated to 
continue.  
Taken together, these conclusions indicate the range of possible 
interactions between state, civil society, and any other sphere, in this case 
science. The powers of the first and last to advance the second will not simply 
work in harmony, as Watson had so utopically envisioned in 1939, nor need the 
state nullify the third sphere’s authority, as effectively occurred for SPSSI during 
the wartime years. They can, indeed, work together productively, but that 
relationship is dynamic and tenuous, and must therefore be approached with 
some caution. Above all, groups must prepare for and recognize the inevitability 
of that interaction, as early SPSSI members did not.16 
                                            
16  Jessica Wang has traced a similar story of political coercion among atomic scientists whose 
efforts at public education about nuclear power during the post-war era were thwarted by 
government surveillance and personal investigations. As she concludes similarly in that 
study, “coercion serves to maintain civil society in so far as it guarantees the rule of law and 
enforces the civility of relationships within both private and public life. That same coercive 
power, however, threatens civil society when it is put to the private purposes of the individual 
public officials who make up the state, or when it exerts a level of surveillance and control 
that curtails the political functions of the publoic as a social space for discussion and debate. 
Hence the relationship between state and society is always an uneasy one, for the state 
simultaneously guarantees the vitality of civil society and threatens its eradication” (Wang, 
2002, p. 333). 
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Challenges from Civil Society 
Watson’s troubles did not end with his departure from Washington. In the post-
war years, despite the low political profile he tried to adopt, he was again 
persecuted for Communist activities, this time by a private organization called 
the American Legion. This section examines this episode as exemplary of the 
sorts of challenges that may be posed to an organization by groups within “civil” 
society itself.  
During the McCarthy Era, not only government agencies but also private 
right-wing organizations undertook investigations of citizens in the hopes of 
eradicating the Communist presence from America. These private groups 
derived their power not from the state, nor from the market, but from society 
itself. Fearful of Communist conspiracy, many Americans felt that their rights 
and freedoms were more secure the more aggressive such groups became. In 
this sense, such right-wing organizations were of the people, by the people, and 
for the people, violating civil liberties to protect them, and should therefore be 
located within the civil society sphere. The activities of groups like the American 
Legion hardly seem “civil” today. But in Cold War America, their work was 
popularly supported in the name of democratic values. 
Watson first caught the attention of the American Legion while working at a 
guidance center in New Rochelle, New York in 1952, where he was advising a 
study on obedience and discipline of children. Because the Legion kept close 
tabs on public happenings and information, it was not long before his work there 
became known to them. One member of the Legion’s Westchester County 
Americanism Commission saw a story about Watson’s work in the local 
newspaper and remembered his name from the HUAC investigations during 
World War II. The member related the information to senior Legion officials. In 
response, the commander of the local Legion post ordered all posts in 
Westchester County to seek Watson’s termination. The post published a 45-
page report on Watson’s communist activities, and initiated an organized 
campaign of pressure on contributors to the Guidance Center to cut off funding 
pending Watson’s investigation.  
Under such pressure, the Center conducted an inquiry to determine 
Watson’s “political background and scientific impartiality” and found him 
unobjectionable in both realms. The Legion rejected their finding, claiming the 
Center members had been fooled by Watson’s slick defenses. In response to 
the Legion’s continued pressure, the Center agreed to its proposal of an 
independent investigation by a local community council. This council requested 
that Watson to prepare a response to the Legion’s 45-page accusation. 
Watson’s 72-page reply addressed each claim in turn, finally concluding that the 
Legion members’ oppressive and deceitful tactics made them no better than the 
communists they claimed to investigate. “I find in [the American Legion authors 
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of the booklet] the same attempt to dupe and dominate, the careless disregard 
of truth when it happens not to serve their interests, the same efforts at 
suppression of those with whom they disagree, the same methods of character 
assassination, the same attitude of combat rather than cooperation, the same 
hostility to the free mind which I hate in the Communist,” Watson wrote 
(Watson, 1954; qtd in Nicholson, 1997, p.52). 
While unlike the HUAC, the local council could not find Watson guilty in the 
face of indisputable evidence to the contrary, this did not keep it from 
admonishing him. Even as it deemed that Watson had not been a conscious 
participant in the Soviet Conspiracy, it advised that he “exercise more caution in 
the future…over the selection of the persons in whose company he will exercise 
his freedom of speech.’” The council further blamed Watson for bringing the 
investigation upon himself through his political indiscretion (Nicholson, 1997, 
p.52). 
The humiliation of the investigation as well as the bad press it generated 
drove Watson even further underground. The episode had cost him dearly in 
time, money, and public esteem. He ceased his contributions to left-wing 
journals, and withdrew from political campaigning altogether. He also became 
increasingly reluctant to sign public statements, effectively removing himself 
from the public sphere (Nicholson, 1997). 
While the Cold War era was a unique moment in the history of democracy, 
the lessons revealed by this episode are still highly relevant today. First, the 
power of the American Legion reveals that civil society itself possesses a very 
real and potent force which can be used to challenge competing powers, like 
that of science in this case. Ironically, of course, what today appears the more 
civil cause – that championed by socially oriented scientists like Watson – was 
defeated in this case by the powers of the civil sphere gone awry. Perhaps we 
cannot truly consider the American Legion a civil society organization given its 
intolerant attitude. But Legion members would surely defend themselves by 
classifying communists among the fanatics that civil society schemes exclude. 
In the 1950s, public opinion was on their side. 
The episode further reveals, then, that the power of civil society can be 
harnessed for negative purposes, and is therefore not in any sense inherently 
good. Rather, the force of public opinion can be applied to further any number 
of causes, not only by state and market but by the public sphere itself. If 
scientists pander to reason, the Legion pandered to fear, and the latter proved 
the stronger impulse in Cold War America. If reasoned discourse is to govern 
the civic realm, safeguards must be instituted not only against state and market 
powers, but also against those of society itself.  
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Finally, the episode reveals a trend noted above in the section on 
challenges from the state. Both political and social challenges undermined the 
power of SPSSI psychologists by calling into question their political neutrality. 
According to this formulation, scientific authority only holds in the absence of a 
political agenda. For example, as noted above, the guidance center’s 
investigation sought to determine Watson’s “political background and scientific 
impartiality.” The juxtaposition is causal, not incidental. This relationship forces 
scientists to choose between authority and activism, with the latter divested of 
all scientific power. This formulation led many like Watson to abandon their 
social or political platforms. 
Whether or not it is preferable to keep science and politics separate, 
however, the notion that they can be kept so, in any absolute sense, is 
implausible today. True neutrality is impossible, and to believe otherwise is to 
attribute to science more objectivity than it merits. By the same token, such 
belief deprives scientists of their social, political, and economic needs. If 
scientists are to help guide the way toward the construction of a vibrant civic 
sphere, their individual political leanings must be acknowledged and accepted 
to the extent that it is appropriate in any given situation. Otherwise, all scientific 
work, pure or applied, will always lie vulnerable to nullification by political 
accusations. 
Watson’s interaction with the American Legion, then, reveals that civil 
society possesses a potent power, which may be manipulated to incivil ends. In 
a politically intolerant environment, any voice may be deprived of power on 
political grounds. Organizations purportedly fighting for the same goals within 
the civil realm – freedom and democracy, for example – may undermine each 
other’s powers if safeguards are not in place to ensure tolerant, reasoned 
discourse.  
Challenges from Science 
Challenges to SPSSI’s civil society work have come from within the scientific 
realm as well. As discussed above, there has been an ongoing debate within 
psychology as to how application-oriented scientific research can or should be. 
For those who champion the cause of action-oriented science, SPSSI has been 
a model scientific organization, leading the way for other psychologists by 
encouraging scientific research on social issues, organizing meetings, journals, 
and funding to support their study (Krech and Cartwright, 1956). The subset of 
scientists who support not only applied science, but value-driven applied 
science, celebrate the work of the strain within SPSSI which has pursued 
research toward specific political and social ends. It is in this vein that SPSSI 
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has been called the “social conscience” of the APA, reminding psychologists of 
what this subset views as the centralits of values to all research (Krech and 
Cartwright, 1956; Harris, 1986; Morawski, 1986). By making psychologists wary 
of the“magic phrase ‘pure science,’” such supporters assert, SPPS has kept 
science on track (Finison, 1986, p.25; Morawksi, 1986). 
But on the other side of the spectrum, purist scientists adamantly oppose 
the assertion that science should be application-oriented at all, let alone guided 
by more particular values in that orientation. As described above, prominent 
psychologists like Skinner and Boring first spoke out against applied science of 
any sort as antithetical to the scientific ethos. For these scientists, SPSSI and 
groups like it violate the objective basis they claim for the already weak (relative 
to harder sciences) scientific authority of psychology. These concerns are not 
only ideological but also professional: for these purists, scientific objectivity is all 
that can separate professional psychologists as “representatives of nature” from 
uncertified “quacks,” conmen, and other non-scientists claiming to treat the 
mind “as the representatives only of prejudice or ignorance” (Nicholson, 1997, 
p.42).17 SPSSI’s applied, and particularly its value-driven, work was a threat to 
this scientific stronghold. As Morawski has described, “psychologists along with 
other professional social scientists had to speak with, to persuade many 
audiences. Empowerment of psychologists’ message depended on their 
recognized authority that, in turn, depended partly on the perception that they 
were not engaged in self-seeking activity but in scrupulous and undesigning 
work” (Morawski, 1986, p.119). From the time of its founding, SPSSI thus found 
its scientific authority challenged by those within the very realm assumed to 
ensure it (Stagner, 1986). 
Over the course of the twentieth century, as psychology assumed a surer 
professional and disciplinary foothold; as applied science gained general 
legitimacy; and as recognition of the inevitable political and social forces that 
affect all science grew, one might have imagined that the controversy over 
activist groups like SPSSI would subside. However, that last trend of recognition 
has also forced the reemergence of the question of the source of scientific, 
particularly social scientific, authority. If psychology is accepted as a legitimate 
field of study today, psychological research is still far more suspect that that of 
the “hard sciences.” Modern Skinners and Borings still tout scientific neutrality 
as an ideal if not real characteristic of psychological study. For such 
researchers, as for SPSSI’s enemies within the state and civil society, the 
organization’s social orientation negates its scientific authority. Values and 
science are separate options, not partners. 
                                            
17  The distinction between the professional and the ideological roots of these concerns should 
not be oversimplified. If scientists’ belief in the truth of scientific knowledge cannot be 
disentangled from their decision to enter into its pursuit, their subsequent professional status 
depends upon their defense of that truth. 
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Given this polarizing professional and ideological pressure, it is no wonder 
that SPSSI today is, by most accounts, far less politically active than it was at 
the time of its founding. As the trend has prompted society member Morawski to 
ask, “was it impossible to embrace the value neutrality associated with proper 
scientific conduct and simultaneously engage in political activism and culture 
criticism? Why have SPSSI’s more political and self-critical aspirations appear 
[sic] to have faded? What are the consequences of adopting the more 
conventional canons of scientific professionalism, on the one hand, and of 
minimizing involvement with the laity, on the other?” (Morawski, 1986, p.123) 
All of these questions are relevant, first, to any social scientific endeavor, 
including that of civil society. How can such endeavors balance the objective 
distance necessary to their studies even as they seek to promote a particular 
social agenda? In particular, for those endeavors that emphasize human 
rationality, how can one rational vision be given priority over any other without 
the injection of the “irrational” grounds of social values? If scientists are to have 
a voice in the civil realm, their social agendas must be acknowledged and 
accepted as a part of their science rather than as its defeat. As discussed 
above in the context of challenges from both state and civil society spheres, the 
opposite expectation – that science can and will be neutral – is both dubious 
and paralyzing. 
Second, these questions are critical to any organization hoping to impact 
the civic sphere through reasoned discourse. Scientifically-minded objectors 
may always undermine such discourse by asserting some value-based or 
irrational strain in an argument. “Reasoned discourse” must take these biases 
for granted, and not discount positions based upon their presence. Civil society 
is not a competition for objectivity, but a space for social and political exchange. 
The equation between reason and science must therefore be problematized. 
Arguments may be more or less reasonable within contemporary formulations 
of civil society depending on the degree to which they further the values of that 
society. So long as a position is tolerant and respectful of others, it is 
reasonable. Civil society organizations must be prepared to defend their work 
on these, as opposed to scientific, grounds. For on the latter, any cause may be 
attacked in the name of objectivity.  
Challenges from Within 
Throughout SPSSI’s history, its own members have been among its harshest 
critics. Perhaps the single greatest attribute of the society that has become 
clear to me through this study is its commitment to self-evaluation. Such 
evaluation may be more or less formal. In the mid-1950s an official membership 
survey was taken to determine whether or not the organization was living up to 
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its constituents’ expectations. In 1986 a series of retrospective articles was 
commissioned to celebrate the society’s fiftieth anniversary as well as to 
evaluate its progress until that point (Harris, 1986). But less formal self-
examination occurs continuously, with every new president’s agenda and every 
new action proposed. In both formal and casual capacities, the organization has 
proven itself relentlessly self-analytic. 
This self-criticism is a testament to its members’ commitment. As former 
society president Martha Mednick has written, “people are attached to [SPSSI] 
as to a home; it is a special place, which provides social and intellectual support 
for those who believe that their science and profession must have a social 
meaning and impact” (Mednick, 1984, p.176). It is toward the maintenance of 
that home that SPSSI members engage in its examination, assessing whether it 
has been or is becoming the dwelling they desire.  
In many cases, it falls short of the expected mark. As we have seen, SPSSI 
has abandoned many of its early political and economic agendas in the face of 
various challenges to its scientific authority and professional stability. Members 
of more radical positions have lodged complaints to this effect. On the other 
side, those more scientifically-oriented members have charged that SPSSI is 
too politically active, and not sufficiently oriented towards research.  
Toqueville has argued that private associations are the training grounds for 
civil society, teaching its members the principles of respectful social negotiation 
and respect. SPSSI is an excellent example of this phenomena. From the elitist 
to the populist, the scientific to the social, SPSSI has had to negotiate amongst 
a wide range of opinions about the organization’s orientation. It has sought not 
to decide between them, but rather to vacillate among them, adopting different 
perspectives as determined by a voting body. And as founding member Ross 
Stagner recalls, “these disputes did not, as a rule, carry over into our personal 
relationships” (Stagner, 1986). This tolerant, democratic environment has 
allowed for the maintenance of these disparate views for more than 75 years. 
Former SPSSI president Harold Proshansky has written that “rarely, if ever, did 
SPSSI experience a crisis that could have split it fatally” (Proshansky, 1986, 
p.133). Rather, having worked to foster dialogue among competing 
perspectives, it has proved far more stable than any unitarily minded 
organization could hope to be. And as Toqueville might have predicted, SPSSI’s 
efforts to encourage participation and ensure a voice for all individuals within 
the organization reflect and enhance the social agenda of democracy and 
egalitarianism promoted without.18 
                                            
18  Whereas de Toqueville describes a strict progression to this process – first organizations 
cultivate respect and values among their members, and then they act upon them in society – 
I here make the weaker point of an unordered relationship between internal and external 
practices. Certainly in the case of SPSSI, if not more generally, internal organizational 
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As an organization empowered by science but directed towards civil 
society, SPSSI will always walk a fine line between the competing forces of 
scientific neutrality and social activism, elite reformism and popular politics. Like 
any healthy body, civil society included, it will always have to balance a variety 
of competing forces. So long as it can maintain its members’ confidence, it can 
maintain their criticism. So long as it can maintain that criticism, it can never 
lose sight of all of its original, and contradictory, goals. That critical tradition may 
be SPSSI’s most instructive legacy of all. 
Conclusions and a Look Ahead 
This article has examined the work of and challenges posed to the Society for 
the Psychological Study of Social Issues, an organization peculiarly situated on 
the border of the scientific and civil society spheres. Long before the modern 
revival of the concept of civil society, SPSSI members were working to advance 
such of its values as public education, respectful discourse, inclusion, the 
protection of civil liberties, and the connection of the individual to the group. 
Challenges posed to its scientific authority by the spheres of state, market, civil 
society and science alike have threatened its ability to act in the civil society 
sphere to promote the values it upholds. The lessons the organization has 
learned from each of these challenges remain critical to all organizations 
seeking to promote civil society today.  
It has also examined two sets of tensions which can be traced throughout 
SPSSI’s history, and which inform the work of any normative social science of 
the rational, that of civil society included. Between the inherent elitism of 
science and democratic values of respectful discourse; between the necessary 
neutrality of science and the desire for social engagement, the socially-active 
scientist walks a fine line. Can scientists in possession of privileged knowledge 
ever interact with the layman as respectful equals? Can scientists ever 
approach their work from a socially-oriented perspective and still maintain the 
authority of their position? These must remain open questions. Further research 
into the work of borderland organizations like SPSSI is clearly needed before 
any conclusions can be drawn. But if the history of SPSSI has demonstrated 
nothing else, it has shown the paradoxes inherent in the position of the socially-
active scientist.  
Finally, this paper has explored the more general relationship between 
science and civil society. Visions of civil society since the enlightenment have 
                                                                                                                                
patterns may just as easily be seen as a microcosmic reflection of a social agenda as the 
cause of it.  
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prized reason as the basis of public discourse and interaction, never asking 
what values and power structures are inherent in that position. Meanwhile, 
scholars of science and society have long worked to understand the complex 
influence which science, as the pinnacle of Western rationality, holds upon 
civilizations which prize reason in this way. Much work remains to be done to 
further the dialogue among these various fields in order to better understand the 
complex, pervasive, and often hidden interactions of scientific authority with the 
other social spheres. What is clear at this point is that such dialogue is both 
indispensable and inevitable. As indicated earlier, through a number of 
international conferences and projects, scientists have begun to explore the 
connections between their work and the vision of civil society quickly gaining 
popularity throughout the world. In the spirit of civil society itself, it is time that 
civil society theorists met them halfway. 
 46  

Bibliography 
Abbott, Andrew. The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert 
Labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. “Introduction: Civil Society I, II, III: Constructing an Empirical 
Concept from Normative Controversies and Historical Transformations.” In 
Jeffrey Alexander, ed., Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Insitutionalization. 
London: Sage Publications, 1998. 
Allport, Gordon. “The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology.” In G. 
Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1954. 
Applegate, Celia. “The ‘Creative Possibilities of Science’ in Civil Society and Public 
Life: A Commentary.” Osiris Vol 17 (July 2002): 351-359. 
Ben-David, Joseph. “The Profession of Science and its Powers.” Minerva Vol. 10, 
No.3 (1972): 362-383. 
Broman, Thomas H. “Introduction: Some Preliminary Considerations on Science 
and Civil Society.” Osiris Vol 17 (July 2002): 1-21. 
Capshew, James H. “Networks of Leadership: A Quantitative Study of SPSSI 
Presidents, 1936-1986.” Journal of Social Issues Vol. 42, No. 1 (1986): 75-
103. 
Capshew, James H. and Alejandra C. Laszlo. “ ‘We Would Not Take No for an 
Answer’: Women Psychologists and Gender Politics During World War II.” 
Journal of Social Issues Vol. 42, No. 1 (1986): 157-180. 
Cook, Harold J. “ Body and Passions: Materialism and the Early Modern State.” 
Osiris Vol 17 (July 2002): 25-48. 
Ehrenberg, John. Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea. New York and 
London: New York University Press, 1999. 
Elias, Norbert. The Civilizing Process. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Oxford and 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994. 
Feyerband, Paul. Science in a Free Society. London: Verso, 1982. 
Finison, Lorenz J. “The Psychological Insurgency: 1936-1945.” Journal of Social 
Issues Vol. 42, No. 1 (1986): 21-33. 
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things. London: Routledge, 2001. 
Franks, Peter. “A Social History of American Psychology up to the Second World 
War.” Dissertation Abstracts International, 1975. 
Gibbons, Michael. The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science 
and Research in Contemporary Societies. London: Sage Publications, 1994. 
Goody, J. R. “Civil Society in an Extra-European Perspective.” In Sudipta Kaviraj 
and Sunil Khilani, eds., Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 149-164. 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Eds. and Trans. Quentin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971. 
Habermas, Jurgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989. 
Habermas, Jurgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy. Trans. William Rehng. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996.  
Hall, John. “Reflections on the Making of Civility in Society.” In Frank Trentmann, 
ed., Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and 
British History. New York and Oxford: Bergahn Books, 2000. 47-57.  
Harris, Benjamin. “Reviewing 50 Years of the Psychology of Social Issues.” Journal 
of Social Issues Vol. 42, No. 1 (1986): 1-20. 
Herman, Ellen. The Romance of Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of 
Experts. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 
Hilgard, Ernest R. “From the Social Gospel to the Psychology of Social Issues: A 
Reminiscence.” Journal of Social Issues Vol. 42, No. 1 (1986): 107-110. 
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. John 
Cumming. New York: Continuum, 1999. 
Jackson, J.A., ed. Professions and Professionalization. Cambridge: University 
Press, 1970. 
Kaviraj, Sudipta and Sunil Khilani, eds. Civil Society: History and Possibilities. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.  
Keane, John. Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998. 
Kocka, Jurgen. “The difficult rise of a civil society: societal history of modern 
Germany.” In Mary Fulbrook, ed., German History Since 1800. London: Arnold, 
1997.  
Krech, David. “The Challenge and the Promise.” Journal of Social Issues Vol. 2 
(1946): 2-6. 
Krech, David and Dorwin Cartwright. “On SPSSI’s First Twenty Years.” The 
American Psychologist Vol 11 (1956): 470-473. 
 51 
Kumar, Krishan. “Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of a Historical Term.” 
British Journal of Sociology Vol. 44 (1993): 375-395. 
Lunbeck, Elizabeth. The Psychiatric Persuasion: Knowledge, Gender, and Power 
in Modern America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Marcuse, Herbert. One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966 
Mednick, Martha T. Shuch. “SPSSI, Advocacy for Social Change, and the Future: 
A Historical Look.” Journal of Social Issues Vol 40, No.3 (1984): 159-77. 
Merton, Robert K. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigations. Ed. Norman W. Storer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1973. 
Miller, Dorris K. “Screening People In, Not Out: Comment on Morawski.” Journal of 
Social Issues Vol. 42, No. 1 (1986): 127-133. 
Morawski, J.G. “Psychologists for Society and Societies for Psychologists: SPSSI’s 
Place Among Professional Organizations.” Journal of Social Issues Vol. 42, 
No. 1 (1986): 111-126. 
Nicholson, Ian. “The Politics of Scientific Social Reform, 1936-1960: Goodwin 
Watson and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.” Journal 
of the History of the Behavioral Sciences Vol 33 (Winter 1997): 39-60. 
Olesko, Kathryn. “History and the History of Science Redux: A Preface.” Osiris Vol 
17 (July 2002): vii-x. 
Perez-Diaz, Victor. “The Public Sphere and a European Civil Society.” In Jeffrey 
Alexander, ed., Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Insitutionalization. London: 
Sage Publications, 1998. 211-238. 
Proshansky, Harold M. “Reflections on Some SPSSI Issues.” Journal of Social 
Issues Vol. 42, No. 1 (1986): 133-137. 
Sargent, S. Stansfeld and Benjamin Harris. “Academic Freedom, Civil Liberties, 
and SPSSI.” Journal of Social Issues Vol. 42, No. 1 (1986): 43-68. 
Sennet, Richard. The Fall of Public Man: On the Social Psychology of Capitalism. 
New York: Random House, 1978. 
Somers, Margaret R. “Narrating and Naturalizing Civil Society and Citizenship 
Theory: The Place of Political Culture and the Public Sphere.” Sociological 
Theory Vol. 13, No. 3 (Nov 1995): 229-274. 
Stagner, Ross. “Reminiscences About the Founding of SPSSI.” Journal of Social 
Issues Vol. 42, No. 1 (1986): 35-42. 
Trentmann, Frank. “Introduction: Paradoxes of Civil Society.” In Frank Trentmann, 
ed. Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and 
British History. New York and Oxford: Bergahn Books, 2000. 
 52 
 53 
Wang, Jessica. “Scientists and the Problem of the Public in Cold War America, 
1945-1960.” Osiris Vol 17 (July 2002): 323-349. 
Wang, Zuoyue. “Saving China Through Science: The Science Society of China, 
Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China.” Osiris Vol 17 
(July 2002): 323-349. 
Watson, Goodwin. “How Social Engineers Came to Be.” Journal of Social 
Psychology Vol 21 (1945):135-141. 
Watson, Goodwin. “Introduction.” Journal of Social Issues Vol. 1 (1945):1-3. 
 
Schriftenreihe der Arbeitsgruppe Zivilgesellschaft: 
historisch-sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven 
Discussion Papers 
 
 
  2001
 
 
P01-801 
 
JÜRGEN KOCKA, PAUL NOLTE, SHALINI RANDERIA, SVEN REICHARD: Neues über 
Zivilgesellschaft aus historisch-sozialwissenschaftlichem Blickwinkel, 104 S. 
 
 
  
 
Bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers schicken Sie, 
bitte, unbedingt einen an Sie adressierten Aufkleber 
mit, sowie je Paper eine Briefmarke im Wert von Euro 
0,51 oder einen "Coupon Réponse International" (für 
Besteller aus dem Ausland). 
 Please send a self-addressed label and postage 
stamps in the amount of 0,51 Euro or a 
"Coupon-Réponse International" (if you are 
ordering from outside Germany) for each WZB-
Paper requested. 
Bestellschein  Order Form 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung gGmbH 
PRESSE- UND INFORMATIONSREFERAT 
Reichpietschufer 50 
 
D-10785 Berlin 
 
Absender z Return Address: 
 
 
 
 
Hiermit bestelle ich folgende(s)Discussion Paper(s) 
z Please send me the following Discussion Paper(s) 
Autor(en) / Kurztitel  
z Author(s) / Title(s) in brief 
Bestellnummer  
z Order no. 
  
